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THE MODERN SNAKE IN THE GRASS: AN 
EXAMINATION OF REAL ESTATE & COMMERCIAL 
LIABILITY UNDER SUPERFUND & SARA AND 
SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTITIONER 
Elizabeth Ann Glass* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the past twenty years there has been an increased public 
concern over the danger posed by the vast number of abandoned 
hazardous waste sites in this country. This interest reached a peak 
in 1978, when President Carter declared a state of emergency in 
Love Canal, a neighborhood located in upstate N ew York. 1 The area 
gained notoriety due to the health hazard posed by chemicals long-
buried in the ground. 2 A high incidence of health problems was 
reported in the Love Canal area-ranging from headaches to birth-
defects. 3 These chronic health problems were associated with chem-
icals seeping from the abandoned hazardous waste site into the land 
on which area homes were located. 4 The residents of Love Canal, 
however, were unable to force the cleanup of the toxic site or to 
recover damages for injuries the abandoned site caused to both 
* A.B., 1983, Cornell University; J.D., 1986, University of Baltimore School of Law; LL.M. 
Candidate Georgetown University Law Center; Law Clerk, Honorable Paul Alpert, Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals, 1986-87 Term. The Author is currently Corporate Counsel for 
E.C.S., Inc., Baltimore, Maryland. 
1 Waste Control Issue Follows Air, Water to Become Top U.S. Environmental Priority, [16 
Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 7 (May 3, 1985). 
2 See No Health Effects from Love Canal, State Appointed Scientific Panel Finds, [11 
Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 948 (Oct. 31, 1980). For a legislative interpretation 
of the events at Love Canal, see S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1980). 
3 See Waste Control Issue Follows Air, Water to Become Top U.S. Environmental Priority, 
[16 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 6,7 (May 3, 1985); see also EPA Draft Report 
Says Love Canal Wastes Dumped in Leaking Land Disposal Facility, [15 Current Develop-
ments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1149-50 (Nov. 2, 1984). 
4 See [16 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 7 (May 3, 1985). 
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persons and property. American law left the inhabitants of Love 
Canal unprotected. 5 
Two years before the declaration of emergency at Love Canal, 
Congress enacted a system of "cradle to grave" regulation of haz-
ardous waste called the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA).6 This legislation was passed as amendments to the Solid 
Waste Disposal Act,7 and it was hoped that "the approach taken by 
this legislation eliminate[d] the last remaining loophole in environ-
mental law, that of unregulated land disposal of discarded materials 
and hazardous waste."8 RCRA identified four primary waste ele-
ments in the management of hazardous waste:9 (1) identification of 
wastes as hazardous;lO (2) tracking the identified wastes from gen-
erator, to transporter, to disposal facility;l1 (3) demanding that fa-
cilities obtain permits before disposing of wastes and establishing 
federal minimum standards for waste disposal;12 and (4) implement-
ing state hazardous waste programs which parallel the federal pro-
gram. 13 RCRA provided the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) with a broad range of enforcement mechanisms which in-
cluded civil as well as criminal penalties,14 Unfortunately, while 
RCRA addressed the problem of existing, operating waste disposal 
sites, it did not anticipate the need for quick response to the release 
5 See W. FRANK, SUPERFUND: LITIGATION AND CLEANUP 1 (1985). 
6 Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991(i) 
(1982 & Supp. 1985». 
7 Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965). Although RCRA was passed as amendments to 
the Solid Waste Disposal Act, the changes were so significant that the entire act has become 
popUlarly known as RCRA. For a general description of the RCRA regulatory program, see 
J. QUARLES, FEDERAL REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTES (1982). 
8 H. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 6238, 6241. 
9 See Goldfarb, The Hazards of Our Hazardous Waste Policy, 19 NAT. RES. J. 249, 253 
(1979). 
10 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982 & Supp. 1985); see also 40 C.F.R. § 261 (1986). 
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922--6924 (1982 & Supp. 1985); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 262--264 (1986). 
1242 U.S.C. § 6925 (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 6906, 6929, 6931 (1982). 
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1982 & Supp. 1985). See generally Environmental Protection 
Agency Memorandum on State/Federal Enforcement Agreements, [Federal Laws] Env't. 
Rep. (BNA) 41:3041 (June 26, 1984). These enforcement provisions include: compliance orders, 
injunctions, civil penalties of up to $25,000.00 per day of violation, permit suspension or 
revocation and criminal indictments for knowing violations of the RCRA statutory provisions. 
42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1982 & Supp. 1985); see also Memorandum on Civil Understanding of 
Enforcement Between the Justice Department and the Environmental Protection Agency, 
[Federal Laws] Env't. Rep. (BNA) 41:2401 (March 23, 1979) (discussing relationship between 
EPA and the Deptartment of Justice concerning environmental litigation). 
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or threatened release of hazardous substances into the environment 
from abandoned hazardous waste sites. 15 As a result, RCRA left the 
EPA unable to respond quickly to the Love Canal situation. 16 
In 1979, in response to the experience of Love Canal, a study 
commissioned by the EPA revealed that there were between 32,000 
and 50,000 waste disposal sites in the United States which contained 
hazardous substances. 17 The study determined that 1,000 to 34,000 
of these existing sites probably contained large quantities of hazard-
ous waste. 18 Moreover, the quantities of hazardous waste abandoned 
at Love Canal were low compared to many other sites. 19 
In 1980, Congress and the Executive branch finally responded to 
increased public pressure to establish guidelines for the cleanup of 
hazardous waste by enacting the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or the 
Act).20 None of the legislation proposed prior to the Ninety-sixth 
Congress, regulating toxic waste and spill cleanup passed. 21 The 
Carter administration submitted a proposal to the Senate in the 
dawn of the Ninety-Sixth Congress.22 It was, however, lost in the 
congressional shuffle.23 The bill which Congress ultimately passed 
on December 11, 1980 was designed to provide the state and federal 
governments and, in some cases, private individuals with the means 
to either compel the cleanup of hazardous waste sites or clean up 
the sites with government funds and then seek reimbursement for 
costs24 incurred in the cleanup process. 25 CERCLA was, however, 
15 W. FRANK, supra note 5, at 1; see also 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6921-6939(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
Note that the legislature dramatically overhauled the RCRA program in 1984, further rem-
edying some of the problems identified at Love Canal. For a discussion of these changes see, 
Rosbe & Gulley, The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendment of 1984: A Dramatic Overhaul 
of the Way America Manages Its Hazardous Wastes, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
10458 (1984). 
16 See EPA Proposed Guidelines for State Hazardous Waste Programs, § 250. 72(a)(3). 
17 FRED C. HART ASSOCIATES, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF CLEANUP COSTS FOR NA-
TIONAL HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEMS (1979), cited in Note, Superfund: Conscripting In-
dustry Support for Environmental Cleanup, 9 ECOLOGY L. Q. 524, 525 (1981). 
18Id. 
19 See generally S. EpSTEIN ET AL., HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA (1982). 
20 See generally Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 
(1982). 
21 Id. at 1-2. 
22 S. 1341, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
23 Grad, supra note 20, at l. 
24 See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
25 Grad, supra note 20, at 2. 
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the product of the last few days of the lame duck session of an 
outgoing Congress. 26 As such, the bill was a hastily assembled piece 
of legislation which represented a compromise between one Senate 
and two House bills. 
The most notable results of the compromise were: (1) the reduction 
in the amount of funds available to sponsor the Superfund program, 27 
and (2) the liability provisions established by the Act.28 In the 
congressional floor debates, the issue of whether CERCLA should 
establish strict, joint and several liability was a point of bitter con-
tention.29 The bill which passed made no mention of the scope of 
liability created under the Act. 30 CERCLA does not address the 
Superfund defendants' right to contribution from joint tortfeasors,31 
and does not discuss whether liability can be assessed retroactively. 32 
Most courts confronting these liability issues have interpreted the 
congressional discussion of predecessor bills and concluded that the 
26 See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984). See 
generally Grad, supra note 20, at 1-2. 
27 The Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund was established by section 221 of the 
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982). 
28 See generally W. FRANK, supra note 15, at 7. 
29 See Grad, supra note 20, at 14, 21, 25. 
30 See W. FRANK, supra note 5, at 7. Moreover, the new Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 makes little changes in the liability provision of CERCLA. See 
Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 107, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1613, 1628-
31. Thus, the judge-made hazardous waste liability law compiled over the past six years, since 
the inception of superfund, is virtually unaffected by the new Act. 
31 W. FRANK, supra note 5, at 7; see also Note, The Right to Contribution for Response 
Costs Under CERCLA, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345, 355 (1985). See generally Moore, When 
is One Generator Liable for Another's Waste?, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 93 (1984-85). 
Note that the new Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) bars 
any claims for contribution brought more than three years after the date of judgment under 
the Act or the date of the issuance of a section 122(g) administrative order. Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 1613, 1649 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9713(g)(3)). 
32 CERCLA has been held to be a retroactive statute. See, e.g., Jones V. Inmont Corp., 584 
F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (congressional intent to make industry pay for the costs 
of cleaning up hazardous wastes sites was sufficient to override the presumption against 
retroactivity); Ohio ex reI. Brown V. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1314 (N.D. Ohio 1983) 
(section 107 could be applied retroactively to impose financial liability upon hazardous waste 
transporters); United States V. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 
840 (W. D. Mo. 1984) (retroactive application of sections 106 and 107 do not violate a defendant's 
due process rights under the fifth amendment). See generally Blaymore, Retroactive Appli-
cation of Superfund: Can Old Dogs Be Taught New Tricks?, 12 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 
1 (1985). For a critical discussion of the retroactive application of joint and several liability 
under Superfund, see Freeman, Statement Before the United States Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary Concerning S.51-Superfund Improvements Act of 1985 at 53-58 and Appendix A 
(June 7, 1985) (statement of George Clemon Freeman, Jr. [hereinafter "Freeman Before the 
Senate"]). 
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Act was intended to establish strict, joint and several, and retroac-
tive liability33-notwithstanding the omission of such language in the 
legislation approved by Congress. 34 This judicial expansion of the 
statutory language has had profound effects on real estate and com-
mercial transactions. 35 Recently, the Act has been criticized as im-
33 New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985); Bulk Distribution 
Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1442--43 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Jones v. Inmont 
Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (S.D. Ohio 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceu-
tical & Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. A. & F. Materials 
Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D. 
Pa. 1983); United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 807-08 (S.D. Ohio 1983); 
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103,1113 (D.N.J. 1983); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 
562 F. Supp. 1300, 1314 (N.D. Ohio 1983); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chern. Co., 544 F. 
Supp. 1135, 1140 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
34 Although the original bills presented in Congress contained a provision imposing joint 
and several liability, the section imposing joint and several liability was stricken from the Act 
before it passed Congress. See Grad, supra note 20, at 19. See also the following cases which 
discuss the legislative history of CERCLA and find that CERCLA allows the imposition of 
joint and several liability despite the absence of an express provision to that effect: N ew York 
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 n. 13 (2d Cir. 1985); Bulk Distribution Centers, 
Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (S.D. Fla. 1984); United States v. Conservation 
Chern. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 62--63 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Phar-
maceutical & Chern. Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. A. & 
F. Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Wade, 577 
F. Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 
807-08 (S.D. Ohio 1983); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chern. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 
n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
For congressional discussions of the implication of the exclusion of the term "joint and 
several" from the Act, see 126 CONGo REC. S14,967 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of 
Senator Stafford, who introduced the compromise bill); 126 CONGo REC. S15,004 (daily ed. 
Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Senator Helms, who disfavored the imposition of joint and several 
liability under the Act); 126 CONGo REC. H11,788-89 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks of 
Congressman Florio, arguing that despite the omission, joint and several liability could be 
imposed under the Act based on the principles of the common law). 
For the position taken by the EPA, see Environmental Protection Agency Memorandum 
on Cost Recovery Actions under the Comprehensive Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act (Aug. 26, 1983), reprinted in [Federal Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 41:2861, 2865 (Oct. 14, 
1983). The issue of whether joint and several liability should be imposed under CERCLA has 
been the topic of numerous law review articles. See generally Comment, Joint and Several 
Liability under Superfund: The Plight of the Small Volume Hazardous Waste Contributor, 
31 WAYNE L. REV. 1057 (1985); Moore, When Is One Generator Liable for Another's Waste?, 
33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 93 (1984-85). Note, Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA, 57 
TEMP. L.Q. 884, 905 (1984); Comment, Joint and Several Liability for Hazardous Waste 
Releases under Superfund, 68 VA. L. REV. 11 (1982); Gulick, Superfund: Conscripting In-
dustry Support for Environmental Cleanup, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 524, 544-45 (1981); Comment, 
Generator Liability Under Superfund for Cleanup of Abandoned Hazardous Waste Dump-
sites, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1229, 1231 (1982). See also Liability, Apportionment, Burden of 
Proof Called Key Legal Issues in Superfund Suits, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 440 
(July 22, 1983); Government Responds to Industry Challenge to Joint and Several Liability 
Under Superfund, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 138 (May 27, 1983). 
35 See, e.g., Small Businesses Have Financial Problems Because of CERCLA Liability, 
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posing liability36 which is unpredictable and overly expansive.37 Some 
of the issues raised by critics of the original Act have been addressed 
by the recent amendments to CERCLA, but many have not. 
This article begins with an overview of CERCLA. Following this 
overview, the discussion focuses on the twin problems of purchaser 
and seller liability under both CERCLA and the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).38 Next, suggestions 
are made for counseling and repr-esenting the client who is involved 
in a real estate or commercial transaction and wishes to avoid Su-
perfund liability. Finally, the article concludes that in searching for 
deep pockets to cover the cost of the cleanup program, courts have 
interpreted liability under the Act to an extreme not evidenced in 
the legislative history of the Act. Further, the imposition of such 
zealous liability without procedural safeguards may be detrimental 
to the general public in the long run. Nevertheless, certain business 
arrangements are still available which may reduce the risk of Su-
perfund liability of persons involved in real estate and commercial 
transactions. 
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME 
A. Basic Elements ojCERCLA 
The Superfund program has five basic elements. The Act: (1) 
provides for the reporting of hazardous waste sites and releases 
or potential releases of hazardous substances;39 (2) establishes a 
House Panel Told, [16 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 518, 518-19 (July 26, 1985); 
Baldwin, Hazardous Waste Problems-Implications for Developers, The Daily Record (Nov. 
21, 1985), at 3, col. 1; see also Environmental Authorities Must Increase Focus on Individuals 
to Bring Progress, [17 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 917 (Oct. 17, 1986). 
36 The liability provisions of CERCLA, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 9607, remain essentially 
unchanged under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-499, 100 Stat. 1617 (1986). The mOllt striking change under the new liability provision is 
that in addition to holding a responsible party liable for response costs incurred in the cleanup 
action, under the new Act a potentially responsible party is now also responsible for the 
interest accrued from the date of demand or the date of initial expenditure, whichever occurs 
first. Id. at 1638-39 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)). 
37 "Legislative Developments in Energy and Environmental Liability," Meeting of the Amer-
ican Bar Association Torts and Insurance Practice Section (Washington D.C. July 10, 1986). 
38 For purposes of this article, "CERCLA" will be used when referring to the 1980 statute, 
"SARA" will be used when referring to the 1986 statute and "Superfund" will be used when 
discussing the two together. 
39 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1982). The person in charge of a facility must immediately report the 
release of any hazardous substance to the National Response Center, an agency originally 
established under the Clean Water Act. Failure to report a release as required could result 
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means and a method by which federal and state governments can 
clean up identified sites by creating a fund (the "Fund") to pay for 
the costs of cleanup;4o (3) creates a mechanism through which the 
EPA can enforce the abatement of a release or threatened release 
of toxic substances;41 (4) delineates guidelines which allow the EPA 
to impose liability for and obtain reimbursement of expenditures 
that the state and federal government (and in some cases private 
persons) make in responding to leaks and cleaning up toxic sites,42 
and; (5) establishes a post-closure liability trust fund to permit the 
cut off of liability for operators of existing hazardous waste disposal 
sites when they close the site in compliance with the RCRA.43 Thus, 
the legislative framework of CERCLA establishes the Superfund 
program under an administrative statute,44 a taxing statute ,45 
in incarceration for up to a year or a fine of up to $10,000.00. While notification pursuant to 
section 103 cannot be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution, it may be used to impose 
civil penalties. The reporting requirement is not applicable where the facility has a RCRA 
permit. See generally GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.04[c] (1984). Note 
that Maryland's Superfund statute also has a reporting requirement but grants immunity to 
persons who assist in preventing the release of hazardous substances. MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. 
CODE ANN. § 7-229 (Supp. 1986). 
40 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982). Cleanup activities are governed by the National Contingency 
Plan (NCP). 42 U.S.C § 9605 (1982). The NCP is the EPA's blueprint for discovering, prior-
itizing and then cleaning up hazardous waste. The sites which pose the greatest hazard to 
human health and welfare are placed on the National Priority List in accordance with the 
NCP. The list is updated periodically. For a discussion of how the EPA prioritizes discovered 
sites, see Brown, Superfund and the National Contingency Plan: How Dirty is "Dirty?" How 
Clean is "Clean?", 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89 (1984). 
Under the NCP, the EPA may begin immediate removal of hazardous waste. Such removal 
must be accomplished within six months or after the agency has spent $1 million. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9604(c)(1) (1982). See generally W. FRANK, supra note 5, at 10. 
The Maryland superfund statute also established a mechanism for listing proposed cleanup 
sites. See MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7-223 (Supp. 1986). 
4142 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982). Maryland's parallel to CERCLA § 106 is found in MD. HEALTH-
ENVT'L CODE ANN. § 7-222(a)(2) (Supp. 1986). 
4242 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 9641 (1982); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 9632-9633 (1982); cf. MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. 
CODE. ANN. § 7-229 (Supp. 1986). 
44 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9615, 9651-9656 (1982); cf. MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. §§ 7-
218-7-222 (Supp. 1986) (Maryland Superfund). 
45 42 U.S.C. §§ 9631-9633 (1982); 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-4682 (1982). The taxing structure 
described in the final act was explained in a Senate Report as follows: 
Financing the Fund primarily for the fees paid by industry is the most equitable and 
rational method of broadly spreading the costs of past, present and future releases 
of hazardous substances among all those industrial sectors and consumers who benefit 
from such substances. The concept of a fund financed largely by appropriations was 
not adopted. A largely appropriated fund establishes a precedent adverse to the 
public interest-it tells polluters that the longer it takes for problems to appear, the 
less responsible they are for paying the costs of their actions, regardless of the 
severity of the impacts. Too often the general taxpayer is asked to pick up the bill 
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and, most significantly for the purposes of this article, a liability 
statute. 46 
B. The Liability Provision: § 107 
Liability under section 107 of the Act47 is triggered by a release48 
or threatened release49 of a hazardous substance50 into the 
environment51 which causes the government to incur expenses52 
for problems he did not create; when costs can be more appropriately allocated to 
specific economic sectors, such costs should not be added to the public debt. 
S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1980). 
46 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982). 
471d. 
48 Section 101(22) of CERCLA defines release broadly as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, 
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping or disposing 
into the environment .... " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982). For a definition of "release" under 
Maryland law, see MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7-201 (Supp. 1986). 
49 The Act does not define the term "threatened release." 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1982). 
50 The term "hazardous substance" has been defined broadly by referring to substances 
defined as hazardous in a number of environmental statutes, including those defined in the 
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982), the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) 
(1984) and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982). See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982). But 
note section 101(14) of CERCLA specifically excludes from the definition of hazardous waste 
"petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed 
or designated as a hazardous substance" under the other subsections of section 101(14). 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982). Natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquified natural gas, synthetic gas 
and mixtures of synthetic and natural gas are all excluded from the statutory definition of 
waste as well. I d. These exclusions do not pose a hazard, for section 104(a) of CERCLA gives 
the President and the EPA, by the President's delegation of power, authority to clean up a 
substance which poses an imminent and substantial threat to human health and welfare 
regardless of whether the pollutant or contaminant is listed under § 101. 42 U. S. C. § 9604(a). 
For a discussion of how the EPA characterizes hazardous substances and Federal exclusions 
under RCRA see Lennett & Greer, State Regulation of Hazardous Waste, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
183, 186-201 (1985). 
For a general discussion of the EPA inspection powers see Environmental Protection 
Agency Memorandum on Inspection Procedures, reprinted in [Federal Laws] Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 41:2451 (Apr. 11, 1977); cf. MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. §§ 7-106-7-108 (1982). 
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8) (1982) for definition of environment under CERCLA. 
52 For a discussion of cases requiring the government to incur some cleanup and response 
costs before allowing recovery, see V. YANNOCONE, B. COHEN & S. DAVIDSON, ENVIRON-
MENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (1983 & Supp. 1984). 
"Response costs" are distinct from damages, although in a Superfund litigation case, the 
response costs are likely to compose the bulk of the damages claim. In order to prove damages 
under the Act, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the damages must be "necessary costs of 
response" and (2) the costs incurred must be "consistent with the national contingency plan." 
Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (S.D. Ohio 1984). 
In United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1115-1116 (D.N.J. 1983), the court determined 
that a bare assertion that the EPA had incurred response costs in cleaning up a Superfund 
site was not sufficient. In rendering its opinion, the court stated, in dicta, that the costs may 
have been recoverable had the government alleged that the costs incurred were costs asso-
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cleaning up the site. 53 These expenses are referred to as "response 
costS."54 Liability under the Superfund program is imposed on four 
classes of persons: (1) the present owner and operator of the waste 
site (including a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States);55 (2) any owner or operator who owned or operated upon 
the land at the time in which the substance was dumped on the site;56 
(3) any generator who arranged to have his own waste taken to the 
site for disposal or treatment;57 and (4) any person who transported 
the waste for disposal or treatment on the site. 58 Through efforts to 
ciated with the investigation of the site and in producing a feasibility study. However, the 
government made no such allegations and so the pleadings were held to be deficient. [d. 
53 See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMER-
GENCY RESPONSE, HW-4, Superfund's Remedial Response Program (rev. ed. 1984). See 
generally Brown, Superfund and the National Contingency Plan: How Dirty is "Dirty?" How 
Clean is "Clean?", 12 ECOLOGY L. Q. 89 (1984). 
54 The term "response costs" is not defined in the Act. Many courts interpret the term 
broadly. See Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (costs incurred 
as a direct result of removing hazardous substances and disposing of them in an environmen-
tally sound manner are recoverable); Velsicol v. Reilly Tar, 8 Chern. & Rad. Waste Lit. Rep. 
(Chern. & Rad. Waste Lit. Rep., Inc.) 631 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (costs of monitoring, assessing 
and/or evaluating a release or potential release site are recoverable); New York v. General 
Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); cf. Cotter Corp. v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 21 ERC 2231 (D. Colo. 1984) (landowner lacked standing to challenge EPA costs 
accrued in investigating site). But see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 714 
F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983) (investigative costs not recoverable under the Act because they are 
different in kind from costs associated with containment actions, treatment or incineration of 
waste, provisions of alternate water supplies and monitoring the cleanup project, all costs 
which are specifically referenced in the Act); United States v. Vertac Chern. Corp., 21 ERC 
1458, 1461 (E.D. Ark 1984) (defendant chemical company's alternative plan to contain the 
toxic wastes, at an estimated cost of $2 million, was superior to the EPA's plan, at an estimated 
cost of $22 million). Likewise, the government may recover its cost to prevent a release or to 
minimize damage to public health. Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 1429. The term "response cost" has 
evolved in the judiciary and it is not clear when such costs incurred by the government cease 
to be recoverable. 
The Maryland statute provides that the state has the right to enter and inspect the premise, 
MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. §§ 7-106-7107 (1982), but the statute is silent as to whether 
the costs of inspection would be considered "response costs" under the state act. 
55 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l) (1982). 
56 See 42 U. S. C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982). 
57 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1982); cf. MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7-209 (Supp. 
1986). The Maryland superfund statute requires generators who generate more than 100 
kilograms of a controlled dangerous substance during one calendar month to notify the Sec-
retary of the identity of the substance, the location where it is generated, and the method of 
treatment and disposal. [d. 
For a discussion of generator liability, see generally DiBenedetto, Generator Liability Under 
the Common Law and Federal and State Statutes, 39 Bus. LAW. 611 (1984); Note, Liability 
for Generators of Hazardous Waste: The Failure of Existing Enforcement Mechanisms, 69 
GEO. L.J. 1047 (1981). 
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1982). See generally Marten, Regulation of the Transportation 
of Hazardous Materials: A Critique and a Proposal, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 345 (1981). 
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pass the costs of cleanup to the parties responsible for the waste 
site, the government developed an expanded rather than a narrowed 
definition of who is a responsible party under the Act. 59 The courts 
have responded to the government interpretations primarily with 
favor. 60 Thus, the terms "owner," "operator," and "transporter" have 
all been defined by the courts to include past and present owners, 
operators, and transporters. 61 Moreover, courts have recently held 
such persons liable under CERCLA without regard to whether these 
persons were in compliance with the state and federal environmental 
laws or were using state of the art disposal methods at the time of 
the action, factors that were given weight in favor of defendants at 
common law. 62 
III. WHO Is AN OWNER OR OPERATOR UNDER CERCLA?63 
The statutory language of CERCLA makes it clear that cer-
tain landowners64 are "covered persons" under section 107 of 
59 See, e.g., United States v. Waste Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985); Artesian Water Co. v. Government 
of New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Del. 198G); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 
1425, (S.D. Ohio 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., Inc., 
579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983); 
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chern. 
Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
60 See supra notes 32--34. 
61 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (present land-
owner); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985) (operator of 
business processing hazardous wastes); United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. 
Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (corporation which arranged for disposal); United States v. Ward, 
618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (electrical equipment rebuilder); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 
584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (past generator of hazardous waste); United States v. A.& 
F. Materials Co., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (manufacturer who arranged for 
disposal); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D. N.J. 1983) (past, nonnegligent off-site 
generator). 
62 See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 
(W.D. Mo. 1984) (conduct which was lawful or even permitted by state can still be subject of 
CERCLA liability); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 20 Env't. 
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1753 (D.S.C. 1984) (traditional defense of governmental approval, state of 
the art technology and compliance with state law not a defense under CERCLA). 
63 While the practitioner should be equally concerned with the definitions of generator and 
transporter under the Act, this Comment will be limited to the problems associated with 
ownership liability. 
64 CERCLA § 101(20) defines the term "owner or operator" as follows: 
"owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, 
or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an 
offshore facility, any person owning or prerating such facility, and (iii) in the case of 
any abandoned facility, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled 
activities at such facility immediately prior to such abandonment. Such term does 
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the Act. 65 Section 107(a)(1) dictates that current owners and opera-
tors of a facility66 may be held liable. In addition, section 107(a)(2) 
states that "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous 
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous 
substances were disposed of" may be held liable. 67 Thus, a widely 
litigated issue has arisen as to whether mere ownership of a hazard-
ous waste site is sufficient to trigger liability.68 The government's 
consistent position is that CERCLA does not require any showing 
of culpability on the part of the defendant landowner69 and that 
ownership alone is sufficient to incur CERCLA liability.70 The dif-
ference, however, in the statutory language between section 
107(a)(1) (current "owner and operator") and section 107(a)(2) 
("owner and operator" at the time of disposal) has created a distinct 
question whether ownership of the site without management is suf-
ficient to impose liability under CERCLA.71 
The express language of the statute mandates that, as a prereq-
uisite to imposing CERCLA liability, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or 
facility, hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the 
vessel or facility. 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(a) (1982). 
65 "Person" is defined under Superfund as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, 
partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, 
municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(21) (1982); cf. MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. § 7-201(r) (Supp. 1986) in which the 
term "person" is defined as including "the federal government, this State, any county, munic-
ipal corporation, or other political subdivision of this State, and any of their units." Id. 
66 The definition of "facility" under CERCLA may be found in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1982). 
For a judicial interpretation of the definition see, State of New York v. General Elec. Co., 
592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). 
67 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 556 F. Supp. 
1301, 1318 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (stating that "with the exception of Superfund legislation, mere 
ownership of the site is insufficient to establish liability"), rev'd on other grounds, 734 F.2d 
159 (4th Cir. 1984). 
68 United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986); United 
States v. Mirabile, 23 ERC 1511 (E.D. Pa. 1985); United States v. Carolawn, 21 ERC 2124 
(S.D.N.C. 1984); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898 (D. N.H. 1984); United States v. 
South Carolina Recycling & Disposal Inc., 21 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1577 (D.S.C. 1984); United 
States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983). See generally, CERCLA Reauthorization 
Dramatically Expands Liability, Lawyer Tells ABA Meeting 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 563 (Aug. 
15, 1986) (problems for innocent landowners); Comment, The Hazardous Waste Abatement 
Liability of Innocent Landowners: A Constitutional Analysis, 17 PAC. L.J. 185 (1985). 
69 See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,206,24 Env't Rep. 
Cas (BNA) 1008, 1041 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (causation need not be shown). 
70 See United States Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, United 
States v. Bissel, No. Y83-3745 (D. Md. filed 1984) (case settled). 
71 See, e.g., United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). 
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that the defendant landowners either owned or operated the facility 
at the time of disposal or currently own and operate the facility. 72 
The disjunctive language in section 107(a)(2) does not expressly 
demand that the landowners caused or contributed to the hazardous 
condition, so long as they owned the site at the time of disposal. In 
contrast, the conjunctive language in section 107(a)(1) implies that 
the plaintiff must show that the current owner both owns and man-
ages the site at the time the action is commenced. This legislative 
implication is, however, without judicial support. The courts consid-
ering ownership liability have ignored the difference in statutory 
language between subsection 107(a)(1) and 107(a)(2). Thus, it ap-
pears that in order to hold a property owner liable under Superfund, 
the government need only show that the person charged was an 
owner or operator of the property at the time of the disposaF3 or 
that he presently owns74 the site. 75 The statutory requirement that 
a current owner both own and operate the site to incur liability has 
been virtually eliminated by judicial interpretation. 76 In this manner, 
judicial gloss has reconciled a discrepancy that was created by the 
statute, but which seems attributable to hasty draftsmanship. 
For example, in New York v. Shore Realty COrp.77 the Second 
Circuit held a development company, its chief executive officer and 
stockholder liable as an owner and operator of a site under subsection 
107(a)(1) even though the company neither owned the site at the 
time of disposal nor caused or contributed to the site during its 
tenure on the property.78 The court explained that CERCLA did not 
require a showing of causation to hold a present owner liable for 
cleanup of the site. 79 All that need be shown is that the party cur-
72 42 u.s.c. § 9607(a) (1982). 
73 See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 
(W.D. Mo. 1984). 
74 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). 
75 But see, infra, notes 242-51 and accompanying text for discussion on whether "sand-
wiched" owners may be held liable under CERCLA. 
76 For example, land owners have been held liable for environmental harm which was caused 
by tenants in possession of leased property even though the landlord was not involved in the 
operations of the tenant and exercised no managerial control over the property at the time 
the hazard was created. See Caldwell v. Gurley Refining Co., 755 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1985); 
United States v. Argent, 21 ERC 1354 (D.N.M. 1984); United States v. South Carolina 
Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 21 ERC 1577 (D.S.C. 1984); see also infra notes 224-32 and 
accompanying text for discussion of the effect of leasing activities on landowner liability. 
77 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). 
78Id. at 1037, 1052. 
79Id. at 1044. 
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rently owns and operates the site. 80 In this case the fact of ownership 
was not contested and the court assumed, without actually deciding, 
that Shore Realty's indifference to the cleanup constituted "operat-
ing" the site for purposes of imposing CERCLA liability.81 Thus, 
under the reasoning of the Second Circuit any present owner who 
fails to clean a site would constitute an "owner or operator" of a site 
for liability purposes. 82 Accordingly, following the Second Circuit 
reasoning, there is no difference between an "owner or operator" 
under section 107(a)(2) and an "owner and operator" under section 
107(a)(1).83 
Similar reasoning is found in United States v. Price. 84 In that case, 
the owners of landfill property were held liable as current owners 
under RCRA, even though they purchased the site several years 
after all dumping of hazardous materials had ceased. The court 
explained that their current owner's "studied indifference" to the 
hazardous condition amounted to "contributing to" the disposal, mak-
ing them site operators as well. 85 
In United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust CO.,86 the court 
was asked to consider whether a foreclosing bank which undisputedly 
owned the site "operated" the site within the meaning of subsection 
107(a)(1). Rather than determine the issue on factual grounds, the 
court held that "[n]otwithstanding the language 'the owner and op-
erator,' a party need not be both an owner and operator to incur 
80 Id. 
81 I d. at 1045. 
82 Id. The court explained: 
Furthermore, as the State points out, accepting Shore's arguments would open a 
huge loophole in CERCLA's coverage. It is quite clear that if the current owner of 
a site could avoid liability merely by having purchased the site after chemical dumping 
had ceased, waste sites certainly would be sold, following the cessation of dumping, 
to new owners who could avoid the liability otherwise required by CERCLA. Con-
gress had well in mind that persons who dump or store hazardous waste sometimes 
cannot be located or may be deceased or judgment-proof ..... We will not interpret 
section 9607(a) in any way that apparently frustrates the statute's goals, in the 
absence of a specific congressional intention otherwise. See Capitano v. Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, 732 F.2d 1066, 1076 (2d Cir. 1984); Bartok v. Boosey & 
Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941, 947 (2d Cir. 1975). 
Id. at 1045 (citations omitted). 
83 The only exception to this reasoning is that in proving the liability of past owners, the 
government must prove that the site was owned or operated at the time of disposal where as 
only current ownership need be shown for present owners. Id. at 1044. 
84 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D. N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982). 
85 Id. at 1073. 
86 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). 
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liability under this subsection. "87 Relying on the Second Circuit anal-
ysis in Shore Realty, the Maryland district court explained: 
The structure of section 107(a) , like so much of this hastily 
patched together compromise Act, is not a model of statutory 
clarity. It is unclear from its face whether subsection (1) holds 
liable both owners and operators or only parties who are both 
owners and operators. This ambiguity stems in large part from 
the placement of the definite article "the" before the term 
"owner" and its omission prior to the term "operator." Proper 
usage dictates that the phrase "the owner and operator" include 
only those persons who are both owners and operators. But by 
no means does Congress always follow the rules of grammar 
when enacting laws of this nation. In fact, to slavishly follow the 
laws of grammar while interpreting acts of Congress would vi-
olate sound canons of statutory interpretation. Misuse of the 
definite article is hardly surprising in a hastily conceived com-
promise statute such as CERCLA, since members of Congress 
might well have had no time to dot all the i's or cross all the t's. 
An examination of the legislative history, sparse as it is, and 
the lone relevant case convinces the Court to interpret the lan-
guage of subsection (1) broadly to include both owners and op-
erators. The House Report accompanying H.R. 85, one of the 
four bills to coalesce into CERCLA, explains the definition of 
"operator" as follows: "In the case of a facility, an 'operator' is 
defined to be a person who is carrying out operational functions 
for the owner of the facility pursuant to an appropriate agree-
ment." By its very definition, an operator cannot be the same 
person as an owner. Therefore, a class defined as consisting of 
persons who are both owners and operators would contain no 
members. Such a definition would render section 107(a)(1) a 
totally useless provision. 88 
The judicial interpretations of section 107(a) are clear. There is no 
causation requirement in imposing legal liability on past and present 
owners.89 All that need be shown is that the landowner currently 
owns the site or that the site was owned at the time of disposal. 90 
Once ownership is proven, liability under CERCLA is strict, joint 
and several. 91 
87 I d. at 577. 
88 Id. at 578 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
89 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). 
90 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). 
91 See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text. 
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IV. PURCHASER LIABILITY: DOES THE MANNER IN WHICH THE 
TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IS HELD OR TRANSFERRED AFFECT 
SUPERFUND LIABILITY? 
Title to property may be held in many different ways. Accordingly, 
transactions to transfer property may take many different forms. 
That property owners, past and present, may be held liable under 
Superfund is clear.92 Also clear is that certain types of owners are 
exempt from liability. The statute explicitly exempts "a person, who, 
without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds 
indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the 
vessel or facility. "93 Similarly, SARA includes an explicit exemption 
for persons who purchase property without knowledge or reason to 
know that it contained hazardous waste.94 Less clear, however, is 
who fits within these exemptions and whether the manner of transfer 
affects liability. Also unclear is how much managerial control an 
employee or stockholder must have before he may be liable as a 
responsible party. The following sections will explore the respective 
liability of shareholders, employees and corporations under Super-
fund to determine whether the manner of transfer and the method 
by which title is held will affect the liability of such persons. 
A. Shareholder Liability 
The EPA has taken the position that a shareholder may be held 
liable for response costs incurred by the government in cleaning up 
a hazardous waste site.95 Shareholders may be liable under three 
theories. First, the term "person," as defined by the Superfund 
statute, is quite broad. 96 Second, shareholders may be found liable 
for the debts of a corporation, including response costs assessed in 
accordance with CERCLA, through application of the equitable doc-
92 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). 
93 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982). 
94 SARA, § 101(f), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986100 Stat. 1613, 1616 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(35». 
93 Memorandum from Courtney M. Price, EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement 
and Compliance Monitoring, regarding the Liability of Corporate Shareholders and Successor 
Corporations for Abandoned Sites Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) at 10 (June 13, 1984). 
96 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982). But note that "person" is only used in sections 107(a)(2), 
(3), & (4). Section 107(a)(l) does not use the term "person." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1}--(4). 
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trine of piercing the corporate veil. 97 Finally, shareholder/officers 
may be held liable through the common law theory of following the 
tort. 98 
In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical 
Co., Inc. (NEPACCO),99 the district court developed a test to de-
termine who is an owner-operator. 100 The court used this test to find 
the vice president and major stockholder of the company liable in 
his individual capacity as an owner-operator because he had actively 
participated in the company's management and, thus, had (1) the 
capacity to control the disposal of hazardous waste at the plant, (2) 
the power to direct negotiations concerning the waste disposal, (3) 
the capacity to prevent and abate the damage caused by the dumping 
of the hazardous wastes at the disposal site. 101 The court explained 
that it would be contrary to public policy to allow the defendant to 
be shielded by the corporate veil because the congressional purpose 
of the Act demands that persons who are in a position to know of 
and control the improper disposal of hazardous waste be held liable 
for the improper disposal of such wastes. 102 
The district court also held the president of the company liable, 
despite the fact that the president's function had been merely su-
pervisory and he had not been present at the plant during the period 
hazardous wastes were disposed.103 The court determined that as 
the president, founder, and major stockholder in the company, the 
defendant had the "capacity and general responsibility ... to control 
the disposal of hazardous wastes at the ... site."104 Thus, applying 
the NEPACCO test, the court found the president strictly liable in 
his individual capacity as an "owner and operator" even though he 
was not present at the site during the time the dumping occurred. 105 
97 United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848-49 
(W.D. Mo. 1984). 
98 E.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985). 
99 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984). 
100 Id. at 847-50. 
101 I d. at 849. 
1021d. at 848-49. 
103 Id. at 849. Although the company president did make frequent trips to check plant 
operations, he was not stationed at the plant and it was not established at trial whether the 
corporate president had prior direct knowledge of the proposed hazardous waste disposal 
plan. Id. Evidence was, however, produced at trial showing that the corporate president was 
aware of the gravity of health hazard the waste material posed and that he had participated 
in at least preliminary negotiations with waste disposal companies. Id. 
104 Id. 
1051d. 
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Unfortunately, the NEPACCO district court did not express 
whether the liability of these two persons was based on their status 
as officers, shareholders, or both. Instead, the court looked to those 
factors in the aggregate to determine that the president and vice 
president had both control and ownership over the site and should 
therefore be liable for the costs of cleanup under CERCLA.l06 
Because the NEPACCO court developed a test of ownership to 
justify holding the defendant stockholders liable in their individual 
capacity, the court suggested that it need not address the issue of 
whether to apply the equitable doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil. 107 The court determined that a shareholder who exercised suf-
ficient management functions could be held individually liable as an 
owner and operator. The court did not, however, discuss how much 
control the shareholder must have before he could be held liable as 
an owner. Nor did the court discuss if the shareholder must also be 
an officer to impose CERCLA liability. It is clear from NEPACCO 
that the shareholder may be held liable even if he is not present on 
the site at the time the offensive conduct occurred-so long as he 
had sufficient control over the site. However, it is not clear from the 
district court opinion how involved a stockholder must be in (a) the 
daily operations of the company, or (b) the specific waste disposal 
operations, before he may be held liable. 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision of the lower 
court, holding that neither NEPACCO, nor its employees or officers, 
could be held liable as the "owner or operator" of the site under 
section 107(a)(1), because they did not own the site on which the 
waste was disposed.l08 The disposal site which was the focus of the 
CERCLA action was separate and apart from the NEPACCO plant. 
In fact, no cleanup operations were brought on to the plant premises. 
Thus, although the company and its officers and employees could be 
106 For a discussion of officer liability see infra notes 129--37 and accompanying text. See 
also United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding 
that the founder, chief executive officer, and majority shareholder could be held liable under 
section 107 of CERCLA due to his high degree of personal involvement in the management 
and daily operations of the site). 
107 579 F. Supp. at 849. See also State v. Ventron Corp., 182 N.J. Super. 210, 440 A.2d 455 
(App. Div. 1981) (parent corporation held liable for pollution caused by its subsidiary because 
the profits derived from the subsidiary were reaped by the parent company); Ohio v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 3 Chern. & Rad. Waste Lit. Rep. (Chern. & Rad. Waste Lit. Rep., Inc.) 507 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1981) (sole shareholder held liable for environmental torts of the corporation 
because no separate identity was maintained between the companies owned by the shareholder 
and shareholder himself-all funds were comingled). 
108 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, April 8, 1987. 
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liable under section, 107(a)(3) by "arranging for the transportation 
and disposal of hazardous substances," they could not be liable as an 
owner-operator where they do not own the site on which the waste 
was disposed. 109 Moreover, the court determined that the liability of 
the individuals under section 107(a)(3) could be imposed without 
disregarding the corporate entity because such individuals "person-
ally arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances in violation of 
CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)."110 The court ex-
plained: 
The government argues Lee can be held individually liable, 
without 'piercing the corporate veil,' because Lee personally 
arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances in violation of 
CERCLA § l07(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). We agree. As dis-
cussed below, Lee can be held individually liable because he 
personally participated in conduct that violated CERCLA; this 
personal liability is distinct from the derivative liability that 
results from 'piercing the corporate veil.' 'The effect of piercing 
a corporate veil is to hold the owner [of the corporation] liable. 
The rationale for piercing the corporate veil is that the corpo-
ration is something less than a bona fide independent entity.' 
Here, Lee is liable because he personally participated in the 
wrongful conduct and not because he is one of the owners of 
what may have been a less than bona fide corporation. For this 
reason, we need not decide whether the district court erred in 
piercing the corporate veil under these circumstances. 
We now turn to Lee's basic argument. Lee argues that he 
cannot be held individually liable for NEPACCO's wrongful con-
duct because he acted solely as a corporate officer or employee 
on behalf of NEPACCO. The liability imposed upon Lee, how-
ever, was not derivative but personal. Liability was not premised 
solely upon Lee's status as a corporate officer or employee. 
Rather, Lee is individually liable under CERCLA § l07(a)(3), 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3), because he personally arranged for the 
transportation and disposal of hazardous substances on behalf of 
NEPACCO and thus actually participated in NEPACCO's CER-
CLA violations. 
A corporate officer is individually liable for the torts he [or 
she] personally commits [on behalf of the corporation] and cannot 
shield himself [or herself] behind a corporation when he [or she] 
is an actual participant in the tort. The fact that an officer is 
acting for a corporation also may make the corporation vicari-
ously or secondarily liable under the doctrine of respondeat su-
109 [d. at 742-43. 
110 [d. at 744. 
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perior; it does not however relieve the individual of his [or her] 
responsibility. (citations omitted).l11 
399 
Other cases have addressed the issue of whether to apply the 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil112 and have concluded that it 
was not necessary to invoke the doctrine in the respective cases 
because the shareholders had actively participated in the manage-
ment of the site113 and, therefore, could be held liable as owner-
operators. For example, in United States v. Mottolo, the court stated 
that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to establish the criteria 
necessary to pierce the corporate veil to hold a shareholder or officer 
liable under CERCLA.u4 Likewise, in New York State v. Shore 
Realty Co., the court rejected the use of the doctrine, instead holding 
the defendant shareholder liable because of his extensive manage-
ment of the company. 115 
While no courts have used the doctrine in the context of holding 
shareholders liable under CERCLA in their individual capacity, nei-
ther have any courts precluded its use. Rather, by their rejection of 
the doctrine in the cases presented, these courts have indicated in 
dicta that the doctrine might be applied-it was merely unnecessary 
to do so in cases involving closely held corporations where the share-
holders were actively participating in the management of the com-
pany and the site. Moreover, the doctrine has been expressly rec-
ognized in the context of holding parent corporations liable under 
CERCLA for the actions of their wholly owned subsidiaries. 116 
B. Liability of Parent Corporations for Acts of Subsidiary 
Whether a parent corporation may be liable for acts of its subsid-
iary similar to the question of whether a stockholder may be held 
liable for corporate acts. In Wehner v. Syntex Corp., the court held 
that the question of whether the parent corporation could be held 
liable for dioxin contamination caused by the parent's subsidiary was 
11l [d. 
112 For a general discussion of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and when its 
application is appropriate, see H.G. HENN & J.R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 
344-75 (1983). 
113 See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. 
114 605 F. Supp. 898, 913 (D.N.H. 1985). 
116 759 F.2d at 1052. 
116 For a discussion of the liability of parent corporations via the doctrine of piercing the 
veil, see Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 
99 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1986). 
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a question of fact which must be developed at trial. Accordingly, the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied.l17 In Idaho 
v. Bunker Hill Co., the court held that pers6nal jurisdiction over a 
foreign parent corporation would be allowed based on the activities 
of the wholly owned subsidiary because affidavits and documents 
submitted by the plaintiff showed that the two corporations were so 
intertwined and the parent so controlled the subsidiary that sub-
jecting the parent to liability in the foreign court would not offend 
traditional notions of fair play and justice. 118 Moreover, the flagrant 
disregard for corporate separateness of the two entities may subject 
the parent corporation to liability as an owner or operator of the site 
under section 107. The court explained: 
Gulf contends that the facility in question was owned and 
operated by Bunker Hill, and not Gulf. The parties have argued 
this issue in much the same fashion as the personal jurisdiction 
117 24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1160, 1161 (N.D. Cal. 1986). In this case the court stated: 
Id. 
The motion for summary judgment is denied. Corporation is a publicly owned life 
sciences and health care company. Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. is the wholly owned American 
subsidiary of Corporation. Syntex (U.S.A.) in turn owns the stock of various subsid-
iaries, including Syntex Agribusiness. Syntex Agribusiness has property and assets 
in the State of Missouri. Corporation itself owns no property in the State of Missouri. 
In order for Corporation to be liable for the alleged dioxin contamination in Missouri, 
the alter ego doctrine must apply. Corporation contends that there is nothing in the 
record that justifies ignoring the corporate separateness of Corporation and Syntax 
Agribusiness. The Court has examined the voluminous exhibits of the parties and 
concludes that the complex issues of law and fact which arise in consideration of the 
alter ego doctrine are not amenable to summary judgment, but rather should await 
determination of full discovery and full and complete trial. 
118 635 F. Supp. 665, (D. Idaho 1986). The court explained its findings as follows: 
Id. 
The affidavits and documents submitted by the State establish that during the 
years 1968 through 1982, Gulf and Bunker Hill were so intertwined, and Gulf so 
controlled the management and operations of Bunker Hill, that subjecting Gulf to 
this court's jurisdiction would neither offend due process considerations nor tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The court has considered all of the 
evidence in the record in making this determination. Significant to the court's deci-
sion, however, are the following: Gulf at times controlled a majority of Bunker Hill's 
board of directors; in matters dealing with pollution problems, Bunker Hill was not 
allowed to spend more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500) without approval of Gulf; 
Bunker Hill's authorized capital was a mere Eleven Hundred Dollars ($1100) while 
Gulf received Twenty-seven Million Dollars ($27,000,000) in dividends from Bunker 
Hill between 1968 and 1974; Bunker Hill's federal tax returns were consolidated with 
Gulf's; all capital expenditures were to be approved by Gulf; and Gulf could overrule 
a transaction or decision regarding management made by Bunker Hill. Gulf's activ-
ities with respect to Bunker Hill, its control of management and operation and its 
overall contacts with this State render it personally subject to the jurisdiction of this 
court. 
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issue discussed above. Specifically, the State has argued that an 
activity/contacts analysis results in a finding that Gulf was the 
de facto operator of the facility, if not the owner. The court 
agrees that the analysis with respect to Gulf's involvement in 
the management and operations of Bunker Hill discussed under 
the personal jurisdiction issue support a conclusion that Gulf was 
an owner or operator for purposes of CERCLA liability. . .. 
Defendant Gulf was in a position to be, and was, intimately 
familiar with hazardous waste disposal and releases at the 
Bunker Hill facility; had the capacity to control such disposal 
and releases; and had the capacity, if not total reserved author-
ity, to make decisions and implement actions and mechanisms to 
prevent and abate the damage caused by the disposal and release 
of hazardous waste at the facility. As noted previously in this 
opinion, approval from Gulf was necessary before more than Five 
Hundred Dollars ($500) could be spent on pollution matters and 
before capital expenditures could be made. Gulf at times con-
trolled a majority of Bunker Hill's board of directors and Gulf 
obtained weekly reports of day-to-day aspects of Bunker Hill's 
operations. With respect to Congress' intent that those who bore 
the fruits must also bear the burdens of hazardous waste dis-
posal, it must be noted that Bunker Hill's authorized capital was 
a mere Eleven Hundred Dollars ($1100) while Gulf received 
Twenty-seven Million Dollars ($27,000,000) in dividends from 
Bunker Hill. Gulf fully owned Bunker Hill. 
The court finds that the evidence presented is sufficient to 
impose liability on Gulf as an owner or operator for purposes of 
Section 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). The court is mindful 
that in adopting the above test, care must be taken so that 
"normal" activities of a parent with respect to its subsidiary do 
not automatically warrant finding the parent an owner or oper-
ator. To hold otherwise in the instant action, however, would 
allow the corporate veil to frustrate congressional purpose. Gulf 
is, in this case, an owner or operator for purposes of CERCLA 
liability. 119 
401 
A more complicated issue was present in City of New York v. 
Exxon COrp.120 The parent of the now defunct subsidiary moved to 
dismiss the CERCLA claims against it for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion. 121 The court adopted the test enunciated in Volkswagen Werk 
Atkiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft COrp.,l22 which sets out five 
factors to consider in determining whether the activities of the par-
ent are sufficient to impute liability to the parent. These are: (1) 
119 [d. 
120 633 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N. Y. 1986). 
121 [d. at 620. 
122 751 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1984). 
402 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:381 
common ownership (such as in the parent-subsidiary relationship); 
(2) financial dependency of the subsidiary on the parent; (3) inter-
ference by the parent in the selection and assignment of the subsid-
iary's personnel; (4) failure to observe corporate formalities; and (5) 
degree of control exercised over the marketing and operational pol-
icies of the subsidiary.123 Applying the five factor test, the court 
found that personal jurisdiction could be exercised over the parent 
even though the alleged acts were made by a defunct subsidiary. 124 
The lesson from these cases is clear. Superfund liability may attach 
where parent corporations do not strictly maintain the distinct in-
tegrity of their subsidiaries. In cases where the subsidiary is under-
capitalized, the incentive of the courts to disregard the corporate 
separateness is strong. To do otherwise, would allow parent corpo-
rations to avoid Superfund liability by creating shell corporations 
which handle the company's hazardous waste. Allowing corporations 
to form such subsidiaries solely for the purpose of avoiding hazardous 
waste liability would surely frustrate the congressional intent of 
forcing cleanup of abandoned waste sites. 
On the other hand, where corporations are adequately capitalized 
and formed for purposes other than avoiding Superfund (or other 
environmental) liability, the corporate separateness should be re-
spected provided the company itself maintained separate corporate 
identities. Factors likely to weigh in favor of corporations are: finan-
cial independence of the subsidiary; independent selection of officers 
and personnel; observances of corporate form~lities; and, indepen-
dent control over marketing, operational and financial decisions. In 
cases in which all or most of these factors are found, then the parent 
should not be found liable for the acts of its subsidiary. 
C. Officer Liability 
Related to the question of shareholder liability under subsections 
107(a)(1) and (2) is the question of officer liability. As explained 
earlier in the discussion of shareholder liability, an officer may be 
held liable under CERCLA if he exercises sufficient control over the 
site. In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical 
Co., the district court explained that the imposition of liability on 
an individual who actively participated in the corporate management 
123 633 F. Supp. at 620-21 (citing Volkswagen Werk Altkiengesellschafr v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 751 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1984». 
124 I d. at 621. 
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of the site was consistent with the intent of Congress "to insure, so 
far as possible, that the parties responsible for the creation of haz-
ardous waste sites be liable for the response costs in cleaning them 
Up."125 
In United States v. Mottolo, the president and principal share-
holder was held liable (in his individual capacity) for the costs of 
cleanup because, "[a]s president of [the company], although he does 
not do everything every day, [the president] is responsible for the 
entire operation. "126 The court determined that the corporation was 
closely held, had few employees (fluctuating between seven and 
twelve), and that the president had been involved in "basically every 
facet" and "just about every aspect" of the company.l27 Likewise, in 
United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., the founder, chief ex-
ecutive officer and major shareholder was held liable under section 
107(a) of CERCLA due to his high degree of personal involvement 
in the operation and management of the hazardous waste site. 128 
The difficulty in deriving a rule from these cases is that they all 
involve closely held corporations in which the officers were also 
shareholders who had a high degree of involvement in all aspects of 
the corporate operations. No cases have yet been reported in which 
an officer who is not also a shareholder has been held liable. In this 
regard the distinctions between the statutory language of subsec-
tions 107(a)(1) and 107(a)(2) may be dispositive. 
Section 107(a)(1) holds only the current "owner and operator" of 
the facility liable. 129 Section 107(a)(2), on the other hand, hold liable 
those who "owned or operated" the facility at the time in which the 
hazardous waste was disposed. 130 Therefore, according to the ex-
press statutory language, a current officer who manages the site, 
but owns no part of the business, should not be held liable under a 
literal reading of the act because he is not both an owner and oper-
ator. On the other hand, a past officer who managed the site at the 
time of disposal and who also did not own the site might be liable 
under the Act. This distinction, of course, is illogical. 
Following this line of reasoning, an officer who presently manages 
the site, but has no ownership interest in the site, could not be held 
126 579 F. Supp. 823, 848 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aiI'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726, 743-
44 (8th Cir. 1986). 
128 605 F. Supp. 898 (D.N.H. 1984). 
127 [d. 
129 628 F. Supp. 391, 409-10 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
129 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l) (1982). 
180 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982). 
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liable so long as he continues to operate and manage the site. How-
ever, if that same person leaves his post, or the business is sold (or 
goes out of business), then he may be held liable under subsection 
107(a)(2) as a past operator-even though he never owned a part of 
the operation. This is an unreasonable result which reflects the poor 
draftmanship in the statute. As mentioned earlier, this distinction is 
not likely to be recognized by courts. 131 
Other courts have refused to allow the corporate shield to protect 
the individual who was factually responsible for the creation or 
continuation of the hazardous waste site without finding liability 
under Superfund, but instead applying the common law principle of 
nuisance. l32 In one case, the court determined that if it allowed 
individuals to escape environmental liability by hiding behind the 
protection of corporate laws it would contribute to the perpetration 
of a fraud on the public. 133 In New York v. Shore Realty COrp.,l34 
the state of N ew York brought suit against Shore Realty Corporation 
and Donald LeoGrande, the corporation's chief officer and sole stock-
holder, to clean up a hazardous waste site located on property which 
Shor~ Realty had purchased for land development purposes. The 
corporate president knew that the site contained hazardous waste 
when he purchased it and he was aware at the time of purchase that 
the site cleanup would be expensive. Neither LeoGrande nor the 
corporate entity had participated in the generation or transportation 
of the hazardous waste. 135 Nonetheless, the court held LeoGrande 
personally liable. 136 
The decision to assign liability for the cost of cleanup to a seem-
ingly innocent property owner who purchased with knowledge of the 
hazardous conditions is not surprising. It is in accord with prior case 
law-both under CERCLA and under the common law theory of 
nuisance. Yet the Shore Realty court extended this liability to 
LeoGrande on the basis of both his individual as well as his corporate 
capacity. The court determined that it would be inequitable to allow 
the corporate president to shield himself from liability by hiding 
behind the corporate veil. 137 The president was in control of the 
corporation and was an active participant in the corporation's tor-
131 See supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text. 
132 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). 
133 New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). 
134 759 F.2d at 1032. 
136 [d. at 1038-39. 
136 [d. at 1052-53. 
137 [d. 
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tious conduct of maintaining a nuisance. However, the court found 
the president liable under the state common law of nuisance without 
finding it necessary to determine Superfund liability or pierce the 
corporate veil. 138 Under the common law, a corporate officer who 
participates in the torts of the corporation may be held liable for the 
resulting harm. 139 LeoGrande had entered into a consent decree with 
the State of New York in which he agreed, both in his individual as 
well as his corporate capacity, to clean up the hazardous waste site-
a nuisance under state common law. LeoGrande failed to comply 
with the order. The court was thus willing to look beyond mere legal 
title and hold the person who was actually responsible for the cleanup 
liable for failure to do so. 
D. Corporate Liability 
Because the definition ofliable "persons" under CERCLA includes 
a corporation,140 a principal concern for corporations is what actions 
may expose them to Superfund liability. While a corporation is ob-
viously liable if it is a generator, transporter, past owner or operator 
of a waste disposal site at the time of disposal or a corporate owner 
and operator,141 a more indefinite question is when a successor cor-
poration assumes liability under CERCLA through purchase of as-
sets, stock exchanges, mergers, joint ventures, or due to the actions 
of an employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
1. Liability Resulting from Acquisition of Contaminated Real 
Estate 
As a general rule, when one corporation sells its assets to another, 
the successor corporation does not assume liability of the predecessor 
simply by virtue of its acquisition of the predecessors corporation's 
assets.142 The EPA has, however, taken the position that broad 
liability should be imposed on successors where: (1) the successor 
expressly or impliedly contracts to assume the obligations of its 
predecessor; (2) the merged entity continues essentially the same 
operation as the prior owner; (3) the transaction amounts to a de 
facto merger; or (4) the transaction was fraudently entered into in 
138 [d. at 1052. There was a question as to whether the company was undercapitalized. [d. 
139 [d. 
140 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982). 
14142 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). 
142 See FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7122, 7123 
(1983). 
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order to avoid environmental liability.143 This position is in accord 
with the common law approach to landowners engaged in ultraha-
zardous activitiesl44 and the general principles of corporate law. 145 
This problem of the extent to which a person can sell or acquire 
its liabilities for hazardous waste disposal has been a topic of judicial 
consideration almost since the conception of the Act.146 In a number 
of cases, the question has arisen in situations where the asset ac-
quired is the waste disposal site itself. In United States v. Price, 147 
the court was faced with the problem of determining the liability of 
both a past generator of a hazardous waste site and the purchaser 
who acquired the property. The sellers had operated the site as a 
non-hazardous landfill from 1969 to 1976. The site was in compliance 
with relevant New Jersey regulations and was represented to the 
buyers as such. The court found that the sellers had permitted the 
unauthorized dumping of hazardous waste materials. The sellers did 
not inform the buyers of the disposal of these hazardous industrial 
wastes and the buyers acquired the property as innocent purchas-
ers.l48 
After reviewing the legislative history of CERCLA, the court 
held that both the buyers as well as the sellers were liable not under 
Superfund but under RCRA.149 The sellers were liable because they 
143 Memorandum from Courtney M. Price, EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement 
and Compliance Monitoring Regarding the Liability of Corporate Shareholders and Successor 
Corporations for Abandoned Sites Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) at 13-15 (June 13, 1984). This legal concept has been 
tenned the "mere continuation" exception to the general rule that an acquiring corporation 
does not assume liability for the torts of the predecessor by purchasing assets. Where a 
corporation acquires substantially all of the assets of another corporation and continues es-
sentially the same operation as the predecessor corporation, the successor corporation may 
be liable for the torts of the predecessor based on the mere continuation aspect of the 
transaction. This exception developed in the context of products liability cases and has been 
applied, by analogy, in the context of hazardous waste disposal. See, e.g., Department of 
Traflsportation v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d ll51 (1980). But see 
United States v. Outboard Marine Co., 549 F. Supp. 1032 (N.D. Ill. 1982). For early cases in 
which the courts developed this continuity of business operations approach, see Oner II, Inc. 
v. United States, 597 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1979); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 
431 A.2d 8ll (1981); Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal.3d 22, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 506 P.2d 3 (1977). 
144 State v. Ventron, 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983); Rylands v. Fletcher, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 
(1866), afl'd, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868). 
145 See generally Note, Successor Landowner Liability for Environmental Torts: Robbing 
Peter to Pay Paul?, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 329 (1982). 
146 See, e.g., United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D. N.J. 1981). 
147 523 F. Supp. at 1055. 
148 [d. at 1073. 
149 [d. at 1072-73. 
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had allowed the waste to be dumped on the site. 150 The buyers were 
held liable because they "contribut[ed] to the disposal (i.e. leaking) 
of wastes merely by virtue of their studied indifference to the haz-
ardous condition" that existed. 151 
The Price court's decision was influenced by a number of factors 
peculiar to the case. First, the purchase price paid for the property 
reflected the fact that the property had previously been used as a 
landfill. 152 Second, the purchaser was a real estate developer and not 
a private individual purchasing the property to build his own resi-
dence. l53 "As sophisticated investors, [the purchasers] had a duty to 
investigate the actual conditions that existed on the property or take 
it as it was. "154 Finally, after learning of the dangerous conditions, 
the purchasers left the site unattended. As owners of the site, they 
failed to abate the hazardous conditions on their premises. 155 
The opposite result was reached in State Department of Environ-
mental Protection v. Ventron Corp. ,156 where "innocent" purchasers 
installed a containment system upon the discovery of hazardous 
waste materials. The trial court found that the buyers had success-
fully abated the hazardous condition by their mitigating actions. 157 
The trial court thus concluded that the purchasers should not be 
150 [d. The court explained: 
It is evident that the current leaking of contaminants from the landfill is being 
contributed to in large measure by the failure of the. . . defendants to store properly 
the chemical wastes. Certainly, that proper storage should have been done in 1971 
and 1972, when the wastes were originally deposited in the landfill. But it cannot be 
denied that their continued failure to rectify the hazardous condition they created 
has been and is contributing to the leaking that is now occurring. 
[d. at 1072. This reasoning can be applied by analogy in the CERCLA context, since the goals 
of CERCLA and RCRA are both to protect the public from hazardous wastes. 
151 [d. at 1073. The court reasoned that the generation of waste need not be active in order 
to hold a landowner liable for the costs of cleanup. See id. 
152 [d. at 1059. 
153 [d. at 1058. 
154 [d. at 1073. 
155 [d. The court found further support for the proposition that landholders who fail to abate 
the hazardous condition should be held liable for the cost of cleanup in section 6934 which 
states that the liability of subsequent landowners will be limited to situations in which they 
"could not reasonably be expected to have actual knowledge of the presence of hazardous 
waste at such facility or site and of its potential for release." [d. at 1074 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6934(b». 
156 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983); see also Comment, Torts-Property-Environmental 
Law-Landowners Who Use or Permit Others To Use Their Property for Toxic Waste Disposal 
Are Strictly Liable for the Resulting Damage, State Department of Environmental Protection 
v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983), 15 RUTGERS L.J. 833 (1984). 
157 94 N.J. at 486-87, 468 A.2d at 156--57. 
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held liable for the response costs. The buyers' actions were not "a 
substantial factor in proximately causing the total dangerous and 
toxic condition. "158 To the contrary, the purchasers had acted with 
providence and had done all within their power to reverse the haz-
ardous situation. Therefore, the court refused to hold the purchasers 
liable for response costs under CERCLA, while in the other cases 
the buyers had been liable. 
Taken together, the two cases demonstrate that an "innocent pur-
chaser" who attempts to rectify the hazardous condition upon dis-
covery is not likely to be held liable for cleanup of hazardous wastes 
located on the purchased property. This principle is consistent with 
the common law of nuisances which holds that a landowner who 
abates (rather than maintains) the nuisance is not liable in tort. On 
the other hand, a sophisticated investor who knows or has reason 
(by virtue of sophistication) to know that the site contains hazardous 
waste will be held liable for response costs. 159 
This discrepancy in liability between innocent landowners and 
sophisticated investors is codified by SARA in CERCLA section 
101(35).160 Under this new section, a person who, at the time of 
acquisition, "did not know and had no reason to know that any 
hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or threatened 
release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility, "161 or who acquired 
it by inheritance or bequest,162 would not be liable under section 107. 
The burden of proving that one is an innocent landowner is, of 
course, on the landowner. 163 Moreover, in determining the landown-
er's relative innocence "the court shall take into account any spe-
cialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, ... 
158 Id. at 492-93, 468 A.2d at 160. In addition to finding that the buyers were not liable, the 
Ventron court allowed the purchasers to recover from the sellers the cost of installing the 
containment system as well as the difference in value between the purchase price of the land 
and actual value of the land containing the hazardous waste. Id. The buyers' recovery was 
based on the fact that the presence of hazardous waste on the site was a latent defect which 
was intentionally concealed by the sellers. Id. at 486. 
159 SARA § 101(0, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 
1616, 1616-17 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B). 
160 SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1616, 
1616-17 (to be codified at, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35». 
161 SARA § 101(0, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 
1616, 1616 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35)(A)(ii». 
162 SARA § 101(f), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 
1616, 1616 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(iii». 
163 SARA § 101(f), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 
1616, 1616 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)). 
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and the ability to detect . . . contamination by appropriate inspec-
tion. "164 
A slightly different problem is presented where the asset pur-
chased is not merely a piece of land, but is a corporation, corporate 
name or other personal property. In Missouri v. Independent Petro-
chemical Corp., the court held, in a very brief opinion, that a cor-
poration may be held liable under CERCLA section 107(a) where its 
corporate predecessor arranged for the disposal of hazardous waste 
at the cleanup site. 165 Unfortunately, the court neither described the 
purchase agreement between the two corporations nor described the 
extent to which the operations of the predecessor corporations were 
continued after purchase. The court merely held that the contract 
to dispose of the waste, made by the predecessor corporation, cre-
ated a cognizable claim against the successor corporation. 166 
Relying on the scant reasoning in Missouri v. Independent Petro-
chemical Corp., the court in United States v. Conservation Chemical 
CO.167 held that a company may be held liable as a transporter and 
disposer of hazardous waste due to the acts of its predecessor. The 
successor corporation incorporated in 1982 and thereafter purchased 
the name and other assets of the predecessor corporation. The pur-
chase agreement expressly provided for the assumption of liability 
by the successor corporation in certain (unspecified) matters. The 
disposal that triggered liability was completed before the successor 
company had even incorporated. The sale agreement did not clearly 
state the relationship the successor corporation was to have with 
the predecessor. Therefore, the court denied the motion for summary 
judgment because a genuine issue as to material facts existed. 168 The 
court noted that, if the relationship of the successor to the prede-
cessor is found to be a continuation, it is likely that the successor 
will be held liable. On the other hand, if the successor is found to be 
a new and separate corporation, it is likely that it "cannot be held 
liable as it was incorporated on October 19, 1982, as counsel makes 
extremely clear, after the closure of the CCC site. "169 
164 SARA § 101(0, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 
1616-17, 1616 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B». 
165 22 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1167, 1168 (E.D. Mo. 1985). 
166 [d. In its conclusion the court remarked that the "[djefendant, of course, remains free 
to assert at trial any of the affirmative defenses listed in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)." [d. 
167 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
168 [d. at 253. 
169 [d. at 253--54. 
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In general, where the purchased assets include a hazardous waste 
site, general corporate laws are unnecessary to impose liability if 
the purchaser continues the same or substantially the same opera-
tions as those of his predecessor. 170 The acquiring owner may be held 
liable under section 107 of CERCLA as a current owner or opera-
tor.l71 Courts have not yet addressed the issue where the acquired 
assets are used for a different purpose, although recent cases suggest 
that the acquiring corporation is likely to be held liable for cleanup 
costs as a current owner, even though the site is used for different 
purposes. 172 Moreover, one court has found the purchaser liable un-
der the common law for failure to abate a public nuisance even 
though the "innocent" purchaser could not be enjoined under Super-
fund. 173 
2. Mergers, Consolidations and Other Transactions Involving 
Exchanges of Stock 
For the uninformed, mergers, consolidations and other transac-
tions involving an exchange of stock pose an even greater risk of 
CERCLA liability than do asset acquisitions. 174 The most significant 
difference between a stock exchange and an asset acquisition, from 
the standpoint of Superfund liability, is that a stock exchange may 
result in liability for the surviving corporation for past hazardous 
waste disposal at sites which the acquired company used or owned 
prior to the exchange. Under corporate law, a surviving corporation 
is held liable for all the debts, contracts and torts (including envi-
ronmentalliabilities) of the predecessor corporation. 175 Therefore, if 
the merged company may be held liable as a past or present owner, 
170 The problem of defining when one corporation ceased and the other began is more 
significant where the corporation is being held liable as a past owner or operator, a generator, 
or a transporter. The issue is largely irrelevant where the corporation owns or operates the 
site presently since it can then be held liable as a present owner. In contrast, the issue is 
critical in these other contexts because if the corporations are separate they may not be 
considered covered persons under the statute. 
171 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982). 
172 See United States v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 20 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1953, 1953-54 (D. 
Ariz. 1984). 
173 New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). 
174 See Varnum, Toxic Waste Liability A Risk in Acquisitions, Nat. L.J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 
15; see also CERCLA Reauthnrization Dramatically Expands Liability, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 
563 (Aug. 15, 1986)(real estate transaction problems seen). 
175 E.g., City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609, 620-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); 
Missouri v. Independent Petrochem. Corp., 24 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1380, 1383-84 (E.D. 
Mo. 1984); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-114(e) (1985); see also United States v. 
Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,253 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
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generator, or transporter, the surviving company will retain that 
liability without regard to when the merger took place or whether 
the successor corporation was aware of the past acts which led to 
the imposition of CERCLA liability. 176 Persons contemplating a stock 
exchange must look very carefully into the history of the corporation 
considered for acquisition to determine whether it may have pro-
duced hazardous wastes as a by-product or in conjunction with any 
of its past or present operations, and if so how these wastes were 
disposed. 177 
The liability of a person purchasing through a stock exchange or 
merger is substantially greater than an asset acquisition. In an asset 
acquisition, the purchaser need only consider the site itself. In a 
merger or stock exchange, inquiry must be made into all corporate 
dealings to determine if any hazardous wastes were generated, 
transported, or owned in any past as well as present sites or oper-
ations, for liability in a merger or stock exchange could extend to 
any such actions. 
3. Liability of a Company for Acts of Employees 
A final means by which a corporation can become liable under 
CERCLA is by the acts of its employees. 178 In United States v. 
South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc. (SCRDI),179 the court 
held that the company could be held liable as an operator of a 
hazardous waste site for three reasons. First, the company was 
generally involved in the hazardous waste business. 18o Second, the 
company's vice president held himself out to the public, the govern-
ment agencies and to potential clients of the waste disposal company 
as a duly authorized agent of the company. The court was unclear 
whether the vice president's authority was express, implied or 
merely apparent authority, but determined that under any of these 
176 See Comment, Successor Landowner Liability for Environmental Torts: Robbing Peter 
to Pay Paul?, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 329 (1982). See generally Murphy, The Impact of Supe1:fund 
and Other Environmental Statutes on Commercial Lending and Investment Activities, 41 
Bus. LAW. 1133 (1986). 
177 See generally Comment, Successor Corporate Liability for Improper Disposal of Haz-
ardous Waste, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 909 (1985). 
178 For a general discussion of the doctrine of respondeat superior, see W. PROSSER & W.P. 
KEETON, TORTS 499-532 (1984). 
179 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20895 (D.S.C. 1984). 
180 The court explained that this involvement was "evidenced by COCC's cleanup of the 
waste disposal site in Clover, South Carolina and subsequent removal of some of the waste 
materials from that site to the Bluff Road facility [the facility which was the subject of suitJ." 
14 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20897. 
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agency theories the company would be bound under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior. 181 
Third, the SGRDI court held that even if the plaintiff could not 
prove that the vice president was an authorized official of the cor-
poration, the company could still be held liable as an operator of the 
site under partnership law by applying the principles of joint ven-
181Id. at 20898. The court explained: 
Id. 
[Tlhe evidence leads this court to conclude that from 1974 to 1976, James Q. A. 
McClure was an employee and servant of COCC-a vice president in charge of the 
company's Solvents and Bulk Chemicals Division. In his official capacity as vice 
president, McClure supervised and directed the storage and disposal of hazardous 
substances at the Bluff Road site. McClure's authority to conduct these activities 
was either express or implied by virtue of his position as vice president. Moreover, 
even if these activities were not expressly or implicitly authorized by COCC, McClure 
clearly had the apparent authority to conduct waste storage and disposal activities. 
Under the principle of apparent authority, "one who holds out another, or allows 
him to appear as having authority to act, as his agent with respect to his business 
generally, or with respect to a particular matter, cannot . . . deny that his apparent 
authority is real." Glens Falls Indemnity Bank Co. v. Palmetto Bank, 23 F. Supp. 
844, 848 (W.D.S.C. 1938) (emphasis added). The court in Glens Falls made the 
following observations: 
The public is compelled to rely upon the apparent authority of agents of ... 
corporations, especially when as managers or superintendents or executives, 
they are placed in control or in charge of the corporation's business. The 
fact that one has an office at the principal place of business of the corporation 
where its actual operations take place, that he is apparently in charge of 
the office and the work, that he supervises and gives orders to employees, 
that he opens letters of the corporation, that he conducts its correspondence, 
that he signs the checks, handles the bank accounts, the cash,' etc. and all 
the surrounding facts and circumstances may be considered and taken into 
account regardless of his title, in determining what his apparent authority 
is. 
The apparent scope of an agent's authority is that authority which a reason-
ably prudent man, induced by the principal's acts or conduct, and in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence and sound discretion, under similar circum-
stances with the party dealing with the agent, and with like knowledge, 
would naturally suppose the agent to have. 
In this case, a reasonably prudent man would naturally have concluded that 
McClure had the authority to conduct hazardous waste activities on behald of COCCo 
Here, McClure was given office space and secretarial support by COCC, conducted 
correspondence relating to hazardous waste activities on COCC stationary, and held 
himself out to the public, to government agencies, and to potential waste disposal 
customers as a duly authorized agent of COCCo Because McClure had either the 
express, implied, or apparent authority to conduct waste storage or disposal activi-
ties, COCC is, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, bound by his acts and liable 
under CERCLA for the result of those acts. E.g., Johns Hopkins University V. 
Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970); Bradley v. Hullander, 272 S.C. 6, 249 S.E.2d 
486 (1978). 
Id. at 20897-98. 
1987] REAL ESTATE LIABILITY 413 
ture. 182 A joint venture is created when two or more persons join 
together for profit or for mutual benefit.l83 No partnership designa-
tion need be made by the parties so long as they intend to work 
together on a venture for profit. 184 
In SCRDI, the court found that the vice president's action of 
soliciting clients coupled with the written contract between the cor-
poration and the vice president to do so, indicated that a joint 
venture existed between the officer, as an individual, and the cor-
poration, as an entity.l86 The law of partnership dictates that one 
joint venturer may be held jointly and severally liable for the torts, 
contracts, and debts incurred by either joint venturer on behalf of 
the joint enterprise. 186 Therefore, the corporation could be held liable 
as an operator under CERCLA based on the joint venture relation-
ship between the corporation and one of its corporate officers. 187 
E. Lenders as Owners or Operators 
Recent cases make it clear that lending institutions may be liable 
under Superfund section 107 if the lender currently exercises or 
exercised in the past so much control over the borrower as to effec-
tively become the owner or operator itself.l88 At issue is whether 
the creditor of an owner or operator fits within the statutory defi-
nition of "owner or operator" set out in section 101(20)(a). This 
section reads as follows: 
"owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any 
person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, 
(ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any 
person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of 
any abandoned facility, any person who owned, operated, or 
otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately prior 
to such abandonment. Such term does not include a person, who, 
without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, 
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security in-
terest in the vessel or facility . . . .189 
182 [d. 
183 [d. 
184 [d. 
185 [d. 
186 [d. The court said that "[a]pplication of this [joint venture] rule to public health and 
safety statutes like CERCLA seems particularly appropriate." [d. 
187 See id. 
188 See, e.g., United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 
1985). 
189 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982). 
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In United States v. Mirabile,l90 the court held that a hazardous 
waste site owner's secured creditor may be held liable for response 
costs under CERCLA section 107 if he exercised control over the 
nuts and bolts operations of the site. 191 The facts are as follows. The 
United States brought suit against the present owners of a site on 
which a paint factory was located. The owners in turn sued two 
private lenders, American Bank and Trust Company (ABT) and 
Mellon Bank (East) Nation Association (Mellon), which had financed 
the manufacturing plant, alleging that the lenders exercised so much 
control over the facility as to constitute "owners" within the meaning 
of CERCLA. The banks in turn sued the United States Small Busi-
ness Administration (SBA), which also had made loans to the owners 
of the plant. 192 In a motion for partial summary judgment, the court 
dismissed the actions against ABT and SBA, but not Mellon Bank. 193 
The Mirabile court explained that the problem of creditor liability 
is largely analogous to the issue of shareholder liability.l94 Just as 
there is an inference of shareholder liability when the shareholder 
engages in active participation in the management of the facility, so 
too is there an implication of liability in the case of a foreclosing 
mortgagee who participates in the management of the facility to an 
extraordinary degree. 195 
190 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
191 The court explained its reasoning as follows: 
Thus, the statutory definition of "owner or operator" becomes critical: 'owner or 
operator' means ... (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any 
person owning or operating such facility . . . . Such term does not include a person, 
who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia 
of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility. 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982). (Emphasis added). 
[d. at 20995. (emphasis in original). Were it not for the underscored exemption from liability, 
the definition would be a hopeless tautology. Nevertheless, the exemption plainly suggests 
that provided a secured creditor does not become overly entangled in the affairs of the actual 
owner or operator of a facility, the creditor may not be held liable for cleanup costs. The 
difficulty arises, of course, in determining how far a secured creditor may go in protecting its 
financial interests before it can be said to have acted as an owner or operator within the 
meaning of the statute. 
192 [d. 
193 [d. at 20997. 
194 The court acknowledged the NEPACCO test for defining who is an owner, but explained 
that, "NEPACCO, Shore and Carolawn provide only limited guidance in the instant case 
because in each case the individual defendants were extremely active in the affairs of closely 
held corporations. " [d. 
195 The court stated: 
The reference to management of the "facility," as opposed to management of the 
affairs of the actual owner or operator of the facility, suggests once again that the 
participation which is critical is participation in operational, production, or waste 
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The Mirabile court distinguished, however, between lender par-
ticipation in the day to day operations of the site versus strictly 
financial involvement. 196 The mortgagee must participate in the man-
agement of the facility itself, and not merely make financial recom-
mendations to the corporate entity, before the foreclosing bank may 
be held liable as an owner and operator under section 107. 197 Ac-
cordingly, the Mirabile court concluded that ABT, a creditor who 
merely foreclosed on the collateral property after all disposal oper-
ations had ceased and who took all prudent and ordinary steps to 
secure the property from vandalism, would not be liable under sec-
tion 107.198 In addition, the court determined that the SBA, a cred-
itor who had the authority to participate in the management of the 
company, but who did not exercise the option, would also be held 
not liable under section 107 (and was thus entitled to summary 
judgment on the issue of liability). 199 
disposal activities. Mere financial ability to control waste disposal practices of the 
sort possessed by the secured creditors in this case is not, in my view, sufficient for 
the imposition of liability. 
[d. at 20995. 
196 The court explained that the intent of CERCLA was "to impose cleanup costs on those 
who bore the fruits of hazardous waste disposal and who were involved in the planning and 
implementation of the disposal practices." [d. 
197 The bank took only the following actions with regard to the property: 
It secured the building against vandalism by boarding up windows and changing 
locks, made inquiries as to the approximate cost of disposal of various drums located 
on the property, and, through its loan officer Donald Hans, visited the property on 
various occasions for the purpose of showing it to prospective purchasers. All these 
activities occurred several months after Turco ceased its operations at the site. 
[d. at 20996. 
198 The court said that it need not decide the issue of whether ABT's successful bid at the 
sheriff's auction vested it with the sort of ownership defined under CERCLA because re-
gardless of the nature of the title ABT held, "its actions with respect to the foreclosure were 
plainly undertaken in an effort to protect its security interest in the property." [d. ABT made 
no effort to continue the operations of its predecessor on the land. In fact, ABT had foreclosed 
on the property eight months after the operations had ceased. [d. 
199 [d. at 20996-97. The court's reasoning in this regard is particularly important: 
Obviously, imposition of liability on secured creditors or lending institutions would 
enhance the government's chances of recovering its cleanup costs, given the fact that 
owners and operators of hazardous waste dumpsites are often elusive, defunct, or 
otherwise judgment proof. It may well be that the imposition of such liability would 
help to ensure more responsible management of such sites. The consideration of such 
policy matters, and the decision as to the imposition of such liability, however, lies 
with Congress. In enacting CERCLA Congress singled out secured creditors for 
protection from liability under certain circumstances. 
Unlike ABT, the SBA never took either legal or equitable title to the site. In this 
respect, its case for summary judgment is stronger than that of ABT. The Mirables 
place principal reliance on the SBA's loan agreement with Turco which apparently 
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In contrast, Mellon Bank, the third Mirabile creditor was held 
potentially liable under CERCLA. The court found that the nature 
of the third creditor's involvement in the site was not clear and 
"requires a more finely tuned determination of the sort of partici-
pation in management which will lead to the imposition of CERCLA 
liability .... "200 The court suggested that Mellon Bank's participa-
tion in the affairs of its borrower may have extended beyond mere 
participation in purely financial affairs.201 The court, therefore, de-
contemplated some degree of involvement which could be characterized as partici-
pation in day-to-day management; however, this involvement apparently never oc-
curred. The loan agreement also contained certain restrictions on Turco's finances 
which the Mirabiles contend are evidence of SBA participation in the management 
of Turco. They argue that in placing restrictions on the use of loan proceeds, the 
SBA "may have failed to prevent Turco from disposing of alleged hazardous sub-
stances on the site." I find nothing in the language of the statute or the case law 
under it which suggests that a lender must ensure that its loan proceeds are applied 
to clean up costs. 
As noted above, I do not believe participation in purely financial aspects of oper-
ation, of the sort which occurred here, is sufficient to bring a lender within the scope 
of CERCLA liability. Furthermore, in the present case, many of the restrictions 
imposed by the SBA loan agreement limited the flow of corporate funds to principals 
of Turco. Thus, these restrictions do not support the Mirabiles' contention that the 
SBA precluded the use of its funds for cleanup activities and should therefore be 
held potentially liable. I will therefore enter summary judgment in favor of the SBA 
on all claims asserted against it. 
Id. The two creditors, ABT and SBA, properly brought themselves within the protection of 
the statute. ABT was protected because it was a secured creditor and SBA because it 
participated in purely financial aspects of the operation. Id. at 20996-97. 
200 Id. at 20997. 
201 See id. The court explained: 
The Mirables place principal reliance upon Mellon's participation, through its loan 
officer Brett Sauers, in the Turco Advisory Board, and upon Mellon loan officer Peter 
McWilliams' post-bankruptcy oversight of the company. Were the record before me 
limited to the activities of Mr. Sauers, I would have little difficulty in granting 
Mellon's motion. 
For example, the Mirables rely upon the deposition testimony of Edwin Stulb, IV 
to establish Sauers' participation in the management of the company; however, that 
testimony unmistakably reveals that Mr. Sauers gave general financial advise and 
did not discuss production or waste disposal . . . . 
What gives me pause with respect to Mellon's summary judgment motion is the 
uncertainty surrounding McWilliams' participation in the management of the com-
pany. Mr. McWilliams testified he became involved with Turco because his superiors 
at Mellon wanted him to have "more of a day-to-day hands-on involvement." He 
described this involvement as including monitoring the cash collateral accounts, 
ensuring that receivables went to the proper account, and establishing a reporting 
system between the company and the bank. (McWilliams dep. at 42, Exhibit F to 
Mirabile response). Under my reasoning outlined above, this sort of activity would 
not give rise to CERCLA liability. 
Mr. Fitch testified it seemed for a period of time as if Mr. McWilliams was "always" 
present at the site. He clarified this by stating that McWilliams visited the plant 
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nied the Mellon Bank's motion for summary judgment and directed 
that, an inquiry be made into its loan officer's participation in the 
manufacturing process. 202 
The issue of creditor liability was also addressed in United States 
v. Maryland National Bank.203 There, the government brought suit 
against a major Maryland bank for response costs incurred while 
cleaning up a site on which the bank held a mortgage. 204 The EPA 
alleged that the bank was a responsible party under section 107 by 
virtue of its foreclosure on the property housing the waste site and, 
as such, should be held strictly, jointly and severally liable for the 
cleanup.205 The government's suit did not join any other parties, 
possibly because the bank was the only potential party both solvent 
and available for judicial process. 
The bank defended against the action on the basis that it was not 
an owner or operator of the site within the definition in section 
101(20)(A) of the Act.206 The court rejected the bank's position and 
held that "[t]he exemption of subsection (20)(A) covers only those 
persons who, at the time of the clean-up, hold indicia of ownership 
[d. 
perhaps once a week. (Fitch dep. at 56; Exhibit B to Mirabile response). He stated 
that Mr. McWilliams would, for example, determine the order in which orders were 
filled. (Fitch dep. at 56). His deposition concluded with the somewhat conclusory 
statement that "Girard Bank had obvious, whatever, control." (Fitch dep. at 187). 
Mr. Curtis testified that at some point Girard Bank "became more heavily involved 
in the day-to-day operations" of Turco. More specifically, he stated that Girard 
demanded that "additional sales efforts be made and whatnot." (Curtis dep. at 39-
40; Exhibit C to Mirabile response). At some point, Harvey Forman, an attorney 
representing Girard, stated that Turco would have to accept the day-to-day super-
vision of Alfred Garfinkle if it wanted to continue operations with Girard funds. 
(Curtis dep. at 43). Finally, Mr. Curtis testified that McWilliams came to the site 
frequently and insisted on certain manufacturing changes and reassignment of per-
sonnel. (Curtis dep. at 46). 
202 [d. The court's holding was not without caveat: 
[d. 
The reed upon which the Mirables seek to impose liability on Mellon is slender 
indeed; however, bearing in mind that all doubts are to be resolved in favor of that 
party opposing a motion for summary judgment, I conclude that, taken as a whole, 
the deposition testimony outlined above presents a genuine issue of fact as to whether 
Mellon Bank, through its predecessor Girard Bank, engaged in the sort of partici-
pation in management which would bring a secured creditor within the scope of 
CERCLA liability. In particular, it would be helpful to have a clearer picture of 
McWilliams' participation in the manufacturing processes and of the extent to which 
Garfinkle acted at the direction of Girard. 
203 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). 
204 [d. at 575. 
205 See id. at 577-78. 
206 [d. at 576. 
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to protect a then-held security interest in the land. "207 The court 
explained that the exclusion was created to protect mortgagees in 
states following the common law such that the lender holds a title 
interest in the land taken as collateral. 208 Accordingly, the court 
reasoned that the exclusion would not apply to former mortgagees, 
such as Maryland National Bank and Trust, who currently hold title 
to the collateral after purchasing it at a foreclosure sale and holding 
title for nearly four years (and a full year before the EPA commenced 
its cleanup operations). 209 
Although purely financial involvement with a borrower should not 
render a lender liable under Superfund, certain activities might more 
readily subject a lender to liability.210 In Maryland National Bank, 
it was made clear, for example, that actions which are aimed at 
protecting the lender's investment rather than simply protecting its 
collateral are likely to bring the lender within the definition of 
"owner" or "operator" under CERCLA.211 Thus, an astounding prin-
ciple emerges. A lender may be held liable under Superfund whether 
2IYI [d. at 579. 
208 See id. at 580. The court relied on H.R. Rep. No. 96-172, Part 1 in reaching its conclusion 
that "Congress intended to protect banks that hold mortgages in jurisdictions governed by 
the common law of mortgages, and not all mortgagees who later acquire title." [d. at 580. 
209 See id. The court distinguished the situation before it from the Mirabile situation. [d. 
In Mirabile, the court found that the purchase of the land at foreclosure was "plainly under-
taken in an effort to protect its security interest in the property. " [d. The M aryland National 
Bank court explained that the rule in Mirabile pertained only to a situation in which a 
mortgagee-turned-owner promptly assigned the property; and to the extent that the Mirabile 
holding "suggests a rule of broader application, this court respectfully disagrees." [d. 
210 Another commentator stated that based on debtor-creditor principles, these activities 
are likely to result in CERCLA liability: 
Taking over the management of the debtor; 
Obtaining the right to have a third party manage the affairs of the debtor; 
Installing an agent to take over the management of the debtor's business; 
Promising payments to other creditors on behalf of the debtor; and 
Foreclosing on contaminated property that is held as security for a loan. 
Burcat, Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Creditors, and Other 
Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING L.J, 5()9, 538 (1986). 
211 Activities desiglll!d merely to create and protect the lenders security interest should not 
give rise to Superfund liability. Among these are: 
Entering into a security agreement; 
Filing financing statements (UCC-l forms), even for hazardous materials; 
Requiring a debtor to submit to the creditor detailed financial statements; 
Auditing the books of a debtor; 
Monitoring cash collateral accounts; 
Establishing a financial reporting system between the debtor and the creditor; 
Providing the debtor with financial counseling; and 
Recommending consultants to the debtor. 
Burcat, supra note 210, at 537-38. 
1987] REAL ESTATE LIABILITY 419 
or not it chooses to foreclose. Under Mirabile, a creditor may be 
held liable if he directs the debtor's operations in an attempt to keep 
the debtor from defaulting.212 Whereas, under Maryland National 
Bank, the creditor may be held liable if it fails to become involved 
in a workout, allows the debtor to default, and then seizes the 
collateral. 213 The combined effect of these two cases puts lenders in 
an extremely awkward situation in circumstances where the bor-
rower is in financial difficulty and has engaged in activities which 
produce hazardous waste. 
The government's decision to charge the foreclosing bank liable as 
an owner is likely to have profound effect on future lending trans-
actions. Lenders holding a lien on real property who have reason to 
believe that the property contains hazardous waste are forced to 
make an economic decision whether or not to foreclose on the prop-
erty if tha debtor defaults. 214 It may be cheaper for the bank to 
write off the amount of the loan as a bad business venture rather 
than risk being held liable for the cost of cleaning up the waste site. 
As a result of this drastic measure, the Maryland National Bank 
holding may profoundly affect future lending transactions in which 
a hazardous waste site is implicated. The practical effect of M ary-
land National Bank may frighten lenders into avoiding loan trans-
actions in which a hazardous waste site is involved, or cause the 
mortgage terms to economically preclude closing the deal. 215 
Because Superfund liability may be imposed on a lender who 
becomes excessively involved in the affair of the borrower, lenders 
should be reluctant to structure loan arrangements which allow or 
require them to become involved in the borrower's affairs, should 
the borrower run into financial difficulty. This effect of Superfund 
may prevent lenders from engaging in typical "workout" techniques 
with borrowers who need financial guidance. When this fact is cou-
pled with the fact that a lender cannot be sure of the degree of 
212 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
213 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). 
214 See Small Businesses Have Financial Problems Because of CERCLA Liability, House 
Panel Told, [16 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 518, 519 (July 26, 1985). See also 
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986); In re T.P. 
Long Chern. Co., 45 Bankr. 278, 288-89 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (bank could not be held liable as 
owner or operator of facility even if the property was repossessed because the bank did not 
participate in the management of the company). 
216 See EPA Chief Asks Senate Judiciary to Retain Joint, Several Liability in Superfund 
Law, [16 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 270 (June 14, 1985), wherein Richmond 
attorney George C. Freeman stated that the EPA enforcement policy "is a signal to investors 
that doing business in the United States has become unpredictable and unfair." 
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Superfund liability it may incur, since environmental audits under-
taken prior to the making of a loan in no way can predict the extent 
of liability later on, loans to borrowers engaged in activities which 
may produce hazardous waste become very shaky investments in-
deed. Thus, the effect of Mirabile and Maryland National Bank on 
persons seeking loans may be very chilling. 216 
F. Leasing Activities: The Landlord and Tenant as Owners or 
Operators 
The process of assessing ownership liability is particularly difficult 
in the context of the landlord/tenant relationship. In order to be held 
liable for the costs of cleanup under CERCLA section 107, it must 
be shown that the potentially responsible party owned, operated, 
generated or transported the waste materials.217 Congress did not 
require that a landowner participate in the management of the prop-
erty in order to be held liable. 218 Rather, CERCLA demands only 
that the landowner be a true owner of the property.219 Thus, an 
owner who leases his land to a tenant who in turn creates an envi-
ronmentally hazardous condition may be held liable under the Act, 
notwithstanding the fact that the owner did not create or contribute 
to the site.220 The test of liability is ownership-not fault. 221 
Liability on the part of the landownerllessor will not relieve the 
lessee from liability.222 As a tenant in possession, the lessee may be 
held liable under CERCLA as an owner or operator.223 In the land-
216 It should be noted that the Maryland legislature, in response to the Maryland National 
Bank decision, enacted a provision which specifically excludes foreclosing lenders from the 
definition of liable person under the Maryland superfund. MD. HEALTH-ENVTL. CODE ANN. 
§ 7-201(x) (1986). 
The effect on lenders who made loans prior to the enactment of CERCLA may be even 
more drastic. These lenders had no way to anticipate the Superfund implications when they 
made their loans. Accordingly, the standard loan clauses which were outlined as suspect may 
be included. If the debtor defaults in such circumstances, the lender is in a real bind. He can 
not become involved in the workout or foreclose on the property, and yet his option to 
participate in management may be sufficient to impose Superfund liability on him. 
21742 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982). Note that CERCLA reversed the common law rule, which 
would not hold the lessor liable for the nuisance unless it existed at the time the premises 
were leased or would necessarily arise from the ordinary use for which the property was 
leased (and of which the lessor was aware). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 379A, 
837(1) (1979). 
218 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982). 
219 See supra notes 64-88 and accompanying text. 
220 E.g., United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354 (D.N.M. 1984). 
221 See supra note 33. 
222 E.g., Fox v. McCoy, 21 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1945, 1949 (M.D. Pa. 1984). 
223 42 U. S. C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982). 
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lord/tenant relationship, the equities between landowner and tenant 
are split. The landowner holds legal title to the property, but the 
tenant is entitled to the exclusive use and enjoyment of the leased 
premises. Therefore, both are owners for the purposes of assessing 
CERCLA liability and both may be held jointly and severally liable 
for the costs of cleanup under the Act. 224 
The term of the lease is not material in cases where the lessee 
created the hazardous condition before the lease expired. Just as 
former owners may be held liable under the Act, former lessees may 
be held accountable for their conduct.225 The fact that the term of 
the lease has ended and the landowner has resumed possession of 
the property is immaterial in determining the liability of a lessee 
who created the hazard on site, although the lessor's conduct, once 
he has discovered the hazardous site, may be considered to mitigate 
(or exacerbate) the lessor's liability. 
Similarly, just as present owners may be held liable for contami-
nation that occurred prior to their tenure on the land, so too may 
tenants be held liable for hazardous waste deposited on the land 
before the lease commenced. Superfund does not assess liability 
based on culpability, but based upon the relationship of the defendant 
with the land. 
The lessor's ability to sue the lessee and the lessee's corresponding 
duty to indemnify the lessor for the costs of cleanup, where the 
lessee created the hazardous site, have yet to be resolved by the 
courts. One court has held that the lessor was entitled to indemni-
fication where the lease was terminated prematurely.226 However, 
this lessee's liability was predicated on the fact that he had misrep-
resented to the lessor the fact that the site was in compliance with 
all relevant environmental statutes. 227 Thus, the lessee's duty to 
indemnify rested on the notion of misrepresentation and not on the 
liability provisions of CERCLA. 
224 See supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text. Note that the linguistic differences 
between section 107(a)(1) and (a)(2) may influence the liability of the landlord and his tenant. 
Section 107(a)(1) holds current owners and operators liable. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1982). In 
contrast, section 107(a)(2) holds former owners or operators liable. In the landlord/tenant 
context, a lessee who creates a site is likely to be liable as a current owner and operator; but 
the lessor should not be held liable unless he exhibits sufficient managerial control over the 
site to be considered both an owner and an operator, rather than merely an owner. On the 
other hand, to be held liable as a past owner or operator no managerial control need be 
proven-all that is necessary is that the potentially responsible party owned or operated the 
site. 
225 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). 
226 Caldwell v. Gurley Refining Co., 755 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1985). 
227 I d. at 651-53. 
422 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:381 
V. SELLER LIABILITY 
A. Liability of Past Owners 
1. Former Owners Who Owned Property at the Time the Hazard 
was Created 
Under the common law, a vendor's liability for injury caused by a 
dangerous condition on the premises is cut off when the vendee has 
had reasonable time and opportunity to abate the dangerous condi-
tion.228 The common law duty of the vendor, therefore, continues for 
a period after sale, but eventually terminates.229 The general prin-
ciple underlying the rule is that liability shifts to subsequent land-
owners once they have had a reasonable time to abate the hazardous 
condition.230 Seller liability, under the common law, is thus limited 
to the time following the sale in which the buyer reasonably could 
be expected to discover and correct the hazardous condition. 231 
CERCLA has, however, radically changed the common law rule. 
Former owners who created the site may no longer escape liability 
by selling the asset. Owners or operators who owned or operated 
the site at the time of disposal remain liable notwithstanding the 
actions of subsequent owners.232 For example, in United States v. 
Reilly Tar & Chemical COrp.,233 the court held that the former 
owners of a property containing a hazardous waste site could be held 
liable for the cleanup of the site even though the site had been sold 
more than ten years before the EPA brought suit.234 The defendant 
in Reilly Tar had owned the facility at the time of the disposal of 
228 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 373 (1979). 
228 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 839 (1979). The general rule is that the seller 
of land is liable for hazardous conditions on the land until the buyer has either discovered or 
had reasonable time to discover the dangerous condition. [d. 
230 See Sarnicandro v. Lake Developers, Inc., 55 N.J. Super. 475, 479, 151 A.2d 48, 51 
(1959). The Sarnicandro court explained the rule of limited seller liability as follows: 
[W]here the vendor creates a situation which interferes with the rights of the public 
or with the use or enjoyment of adjoining lands ... [and] where the land is trans-
ferred in such a condition that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to those 
outside the premises, the vendor has been held liable on the theory of a public or a 
private nuisance, at least for a reasonable length of time after he has parted with 
possession. 
55 N.J. Super. at 481, 151 A.2d at 51. 
231 See Clarke v. Boysen, 39 F.2d 800, 810 (10th Cir. 1930). 
232 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). See also United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. 
Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982). 
233 546 F. Supp. at 1100. 
234 [d. at 1120. 
1987] REAL ESTATE LIABILITY 423 
the hazardous waste,236 and could, therefore, be held jointly and 
severally liable under the Act for the costs of cleanup.236 The court 
was not swayed by the fact that the former owners no longer had 
control of the waste site, because the plain language of the statute 
stated that liability would be imposed upon former owners and op-
erators "who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance 
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substance 
were disposed of . . . . "237 
A similar result was reached in Nunn v. Chemical Management, 
Inc.,238 where the seller was held liable for the costs of cleanup 
because he had warranted to the buyer that the land was in compli-
ance with state and federal laws. The site was not, in fact, in com-
pliance. 239 The buyer, upon discovery of the release of the hazardous 
substances, acquired a duty to clean up the site and became liable 
under CERCLA as a current owner.240 The court held that the 
seller's warranty gave the buyer a basis on which to sue the seller 
for costs incurred and liability assessed due to the failure of the site 
to meet standards imposed by the state and federal environmental 
statutes. Thus, while the buyer was properly held liable under CER-
CLA as a current owner, the seller was liable to the buyer based on 
contract. 241 
2. Intervening Owners 
An interesting question considered by commentators, and which 
has only recently been addressed by any court, is whether an owner 
who did not himself create or contribute to the hazardous waste site 
but merely held title to the land at some point subsequent to disposal 
may be held liable under CERCLA. The generator of the waste is 
clearly liable.242 Additionally, the purchaser may also be held liable 
as a current owner.243 The question is whether the intervening owner 
236 Id. at 1105-06. 
236Id. at 1118. 
237 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982). 
238 22 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1763 (D. Kan. 1985). 
239Id. at 1765-67. 
240 I d. at 1766. 
241 Id. at 1767. Under SARA § 101(35), the buyer in Nunn would probably be held not liable 
under Superfund, since he seems to fit the definition of an innocent purchaser. The reasoning 
of Nunn, with regard to the ability of a buyer to sue a seller, however, survives SARA. 
24242 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1982). 
243 But see SARA § 101(0, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 
(100 Stat.) 1616, 1616-17 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B» (innocent landowner defense to 
landowner liability under Superfund). 
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who is neither a generator as defined under the act nor a present 
owner may be held liable. This question was answered in the affir-
mative in United States v. Carolawn. 244 
In Carolawn, the court was asked to consider whether a chemical 
company that held title to a hazardous waste disposal site for less 
than one hour could be considered an owner or operator within the 
meaning of section 107 of CERCLA.245 The defendant contended 
that it had acted merely as a conduit in the transfer of title and had 
no true ownership interest in the facility. The court, however, de-
termined that because there was a factual dispute as to whether the 
defendant had acted only as a conduit or whether the defendant was 
in reality acquiring an ownership interest in the property, the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue should be de-
nied. Alth<mgh the company held the property for less than an hour, 
it might be liable under CERCLA.246 
The court's holding in Carolawn is arguably incorrect, although 
the basis for the holding is unclear. The statutory language of CER-
CLA does not contemplate holding the intervening owners liable. 247 
Under the common law, a seller is liable to the buyer for only a 
limited period of time after the sale.248 Property owners who pres-
ently hold title to the land may be held liable, from a policy per-
spective, because they owe the public a duty to maintain the prem-
ises in a safe condition and free from a nuisance. Therefore, even if 
these owners did not create the site themselves, but were the victims 
of a midnight dumping of the hazardous materials on their land, 
public policy dictates that the present owner should clean up the 
site. 249 
244 21 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (D.S.C. 1984). 
245 [d. at 2127-29. 
246 [d. at 2128. 
247 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982). 
248 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 373 (negligence) and § 840(A) (nuisance) (neg-
ligent vendor or vendor creating nuisance is liable until vendee discovers or could reasonably 
discover harmful condition). But see State Dept. Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 182 N.J. 
Super. 210, 440 A.2d 455 (1981) (corporation that spilled, leaked and deposited mercury into 
local creek liable despite sale of facility); Merrick v. Murphy, 83 Misc. 2d 39, 371 N. Y.S.2d 97 
(Sup. Ct. 1975) (liability for affirmative acts creating a dangerous condition on the premises 
not cut off by sale). 
249 CERCLA has been interpreted to impose strict liability-liability without regard to 
culpability, negligence, or fault. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. The only exceptions 
to this imposition of strict liability are outlined in section 107(b). These include: an act of God, 
an act of war, and an act of an unrelated third party with whom the defendant has no 
contractual relationship. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982). A due care standard is necessary to 
establish the affirmative defenses. United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 
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The current owner's obligation to clean up the site stems from the 
common law and was not changed by CERCLA. Legislation was 
necessary to hold the persons who owned the site at the time it was 
created liable for the costs of cleanup. But this was a change from 
the common law, which held that only property owners have an 
obligation to maintain their land in a safe (nuisance free) condition. 
It logically follows that since the legislature expressly expanded the 
common law liability for hazardous waste to include past owners who 
created the site, in doing so they did not intend to include intervening 
owners. Had the legislature intended such broad coverage, it would 
have said so rather than carving out a rather specific exception to 
the common law rule. 
A case which held that an intervening owner should not be held 
liable under CERCLA is Cadillac Fairview/California Inc. v. Dow 
Chemical CO.250 In that case a private plaintiff brought suit seeking 
indemnification against two parties under CERCLA "because they 
owned the site before plaintiff and were 'aware that at the time it 
owned the Site that chemical substances including hazardous wastes 
and hazardous substances had been disposed of on the Site, and that 
they failed and continues [sic] to fail to undertake any removal, 
remedial or other action to prevent release of such chemical sub-
stances from the site into the environment. "'251 The defendant ar-
gued that the scope of liability under CERCLA was "not so broad 
as to encompass a party who merely owned the site at a previous 
point in time, who neither deposited nor allowed others to deposit 
hazardous wastes on the site. "252 The court held in favor of the 
defendant explaining as follows: 
The only provision in CERCLA which imposes liability for 
cleanup and removal is 42 U.S.C., Section 9607, and it is under 
this section that plaintiff proceeds. 
Section 9607(a) sets forth four classes of action liable under 
the Act for three types of costs. This defendant fits none of these 
classes of potential defendant. The only class which might con-
ceivably include this defendant is § 9607(a)(2). 
Since this defendant is not alleged to be an owner at any time 
when the disposals complained of were made, but is alleged to 
162, 203 (W.D. Mo. 1985). To date, no case has recognized the affirmative defense of an act 
of an unrelated third party and owners have been held liable even where vandals caused the 
damage. 
250 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
251 I d. at 1113. 
252Id. 
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have merely owned the site after such disposal and prior in time 
to plaintiff's ownership, it cannot be liable under the Act. 
Plaintiff has argued that the section includes past as well as 
present owners because no specification is made. However, none 
need be made because of the express limitation provided by the 
words "at the time of disposal." Since this defendant is not in 
that class, no cause of action under § 9607 can be stated against 
it. 253 
Thus, the better rule appears to be that intervening owners should 
not be held liable under section 107(a) of Superfund. 
All rules have qualifications, and the case of the intervening land-
owner is no exception. Despite the seeming lack of coverage for 
intervening owners, those who learn or learned of existence of the 
hazardous site during their tenure of the land and sold it without 
disclosing the hazard, may be held liable under CERCLA section 
101(35)(C) as added by SARA.254 This new provision states that "if 
the defendant obtained actual knowledge of the release or threatened 
release of a hazardous substance at such facility when the defendant 
owned the real property and then subsequently transferred owner-
ship of the property to another person without disclosing such knowl-
edge, such defendant shall be treated as liable under section 
107(a)(1) and no defense under section 107(b)(3) shall be available 
to such defendant. "255 Thus, SARA effectively holds all past owners 
potentially liable under Superfund where they knew of the existence 
of the site. Past owners who are creators of the site may be held 
liable under section 107(a).256 Intervening owners may be held liable 
under the new section 101(35)(c).257 
B. Brokers as Sellers and Sellers' Agents 
The real estate industry has emerged as an unwitting target of 
environmental liability. For example, a couple looking for a home 
informed their real estate agent that they wanted a home which was 
far away from any poisonous substances because they wanted to 
protect their children from such harm.258 With the agent's help, the 
253 [d. 
254 SARA, § 101(0, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1617 (1986) (codified at 42 u.s.c. 
§ 9601(35)(C», 
266 [d. (emphasis added). 
256 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). 
267 SARA, § 101(0, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1617 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(35)(C». 
268 See 71 ABA J. 20 (1985). 
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couple found a house and signed a contract of sale. The property 
inspection report did not indicate any evidence of hazardous mate-
rials, but a casual conversation with a neighbor indicated that the 
couple had been sold a home near a toxic landfill. The couple refused 
to close the deal, and the lending bank, among others, sued the 
couple for breach of contract. The couple countersued, claiming that 
the real estate agent, the property inspectors and the title searchers 
failed to disclose the environmental hazard to them. 259 
The duties a real estate agent owes a client are unclear.26O Liability 
may be assessed against real estate agents and brokers based on 
two theories( negligence261 and breach of contract.262 In Easton v. 
Strassburger,263 a California district court held a real estate agent 
liable for failure to disclose soil instability and a history of landslides 
in the area because the agent had a duty to "conduct a reasonably 
competent and diligent inspection" of the premises to be sold. 264 In 
addition, the court held that the agent had a duty to disclose to the 
buyer material facts and adverse factors which the agent should 
have known about.266 The court did not, however, discuss what 
factors an agent generally "should have known."266 
Despite this duty, the extent of the broker's duty to inquire as to 
the existence of environmental problems on the land offered for sale 
is unclear under present law.267 The difficulty in using a duty to 
inspect as a basis for assessing environmental liability lies in the 
latent nature of many hazardous waste sites.268 Once the broker 
knows of the existence of these violations, however, failure to dis-
close could be considered negligence or fraud.269 But if the broker is 
not aware of these violations and has no reason to know of them 
apart from asking, then he should not be deemed liable-unless of 
259 Id. 
2&0 See generally Edwards, Successor Landowner and Real Estate Broker Liability in 
Environmental Torts: Going Beyond Property Lines, 1 REAL EST. FIN. J. 16 (1985); Fisher, 
Be on the Lookout! Hazardous Waste, Real Estate News, Aug. 1985, at 22. 
261 See Edwards supra note 260, at 19-23. 
262 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(2) (1979). 
268 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984). 
264Id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390. 
265Id. at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391. 
286Id. at 104-05, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391. 
261 See generally Miller, Professional Duty of Real Estate Brokers to Buyers, NAT. L.J., 
Nov. 25, 1985, at 15. 
268 See Edwards supra note 260, at 25-26. See generally Note, Imposing Tort Liability on 
Real Estate Brokers Selling Defective Housing, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1861 (1986). 
269 See 71 ABA J. 20 (1985). 
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course it appears that his failure to ask is a breach of duty, or 
constitutes wilful blindness. 
VI. GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTITIONER 
A. Protecting the Buyer/Client 
To date, there is very little an attorney can do to protect his client 
from environmental liability. Possible ways to limit the buyer's lia-
bility include: (1) obtaining a warranty from the vendor or certifi-
cation from the vendor's corporate officers stating that the land is 
in compliance with all environmental laws and regulations; (2) ob-
taining an indemnification agreement supported by a bond or letter 
of credit; (3) obtaining insurance; and (4) most importantly, obtaining 
accurate information as to the extent of liability which may be in-
curred and upon which a realistic risk assessment can be made. 
1. By Contract 
a. I ndemnijication, Certification and Warranties 
CERCLA provides that a contract of indemnification will not affect 
the government's right to sue a liable party.270 Such a contract term 
will, however, enable a party sued pursuant to CERCLA to recover 
from the other party to the indemnity contract the costs contem-
plated in the contract.271 Thus, indemnification contracts give the 
buyer of a site, asset or other acquisition a cause of action against 
the seller for reimbursement of costs incurred due to the violation 
of an environmental statute. 272 
This protection is especially important in cases where the seller is 
an intervening landowner273-that is, the seller did not dispose of 
the waste-since such a seller may not otherwise be liable once the 
270 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1982). A new exception to this rule was carved out in SARA. 
New section 119(c) allows the President to indemnify response action contractors for negli-
gence in performing their duties. The extent of liability is, of course, limited to injuries 
sustained in response actions and is available only where insurance to cover such liability is 
not available. SARA § 119, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1617 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9619). 
271 Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984), aiI'd, 804 F.2d 
1454 (9th Cir. 1986). 
272 See In re Conservation Chern. Co., 22 ERC 1761 (8th Cir. 1984) (dicta). 
273 See supra note 249 and accompanying text for discussion of intervening owner liability. 
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site is sold. 274 Use of indemnification agreements is less important, 
however, where the seller is a liable past owner since the joint alld 
several standard of liability275 gives the buyer an automatic right to 
at least partial recovery from the seller. Since a buyer may not know 
his seller's status regarding the release of hazardous waste at the 
time of purchase, including an indemnification clause in any case in 
which the seller might be considered an intervening owner is a better 
idea. 
It may be advisable to ask seller to post a surety bond or offer a 
letter of credit276 along with the indemnification agreement. Of 
course, indemnity contracts as well as bonds and letters of credit 
274 Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 21 ERC 1108, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 
1984) (holding inter alia that intervening owner was not liable under CERCLA). But see 
SARA, § 101(35) (holding sellers who transfer property with knowledge of the waste site 
liable). 
275 Although most courts have interpreted section 107 ofCERCLA as allowing the imposition 
of joint and several liability, some courts have held that joint and several liability should not 
be imposed where "defendants establish that a reasonable basis exists for apportioning the 
harm amongst them." United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The 
defendants bear the burden of suggesting an apportionment formula. See United States v. A. 
& F. Materials, Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Chern-Dyne, 
572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983). The criteria used to determine whether the damage 
may be apportioned are not fixed by statute, but the following have been adopted by some 
courts: 
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a 
discharge release or disposal of hazardous waste can be distinguished; 
(ii) the amount of hazardous waste involved; 
(iii) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved; 
(iv) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, transpor-
tation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste; 
(v) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the hazardous 
waste; and 
(vi) the degree of cooperation by the parties with the Federal, State, or 
local officials to prevent any harm to the public or the environment. 
United States v. A. & F. Materials, Co., 578 F. Supp. at 1256; United States v. Stringfellow, 
20 ERC 1905, 1910 (C.D. Cal. 1984). For a discussion of the current debate over the appor-
tionment ofliability see, Deadlines in House Superfund Measure Impossible to Meet, Defense 
Official Says, [16 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 507 (July 26, 1985). 
The new act, SARA, has partially resolved this debate by enacting section 113(f), which 
imposes a statute of limitations on persons suing for contribution. SARA § 113, Pub. L. No. 
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1647-1649 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9713(f)). 
For example, it would be unreasonable to hold an intervening owner liable for the entire 
cost of cleanup where the damage on the site during his tenure on the land was de minimus 
and the majority of the waste materials were placed on the land after his term had ended. 
276 The problem with using a surety bond, hold back, guarantee, escrowed funds or letter 
of credit as security is that the buyer has no way to estimate the extent of liability in order 
to determine what is adequate coverage. In addition, the buyer cannot determine how long 
the device should remain in effect. See Whitsett, Hazardous Waste and the Secured Lender 
(Aug. 12, 1986) (Paper presented to the ABA). 
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will cause the price of the property to increase. In addition, the 
utility of such devices depends upon the financial health of the party 
to the contract. The buyer must thus make a business decision 
whether to pursue the incorporation of an indemnity clause or similar 
device into the contract of sale or whether to pay a lessor purchase 
price and accept the risk that he might suffer liability. 
Another device that offers the buyer similar legal protection is 
the warranty. Courts have held liable to the buyer sellers who 
warranted that the property was in compliance with all environmen-
tal laws when the site actually was in violation of CERCLA.277 Thus, 
contracts certifying or warranting that the land is sound environ-
mentally are enforceable against the seller of land, giving the buyer 
a cause of action against the seller in the event he should be assessed 
with environmental liability. 278 Without such a clause, the buyer has 
no cause of action against the seller. His sole remedy would be to 
sue the seller for fraud, provided that facts of fraud can be sup-
ported.279 
b. Insurance and Title Insurance 
Although other environmental statutes require the owner-opera-
tor of a hazardous waste storage or treatment facility to carry in-
surance,28O landowners other than such persons are not required to 
carry this insurance. Thus, a prospective buyer who purchases land 
without buying insurance will not find himself in violation of CER-
CLA. 
Even if a landowner desired to purchase insurance, it is unlikely 
that such insurance would provide the desired protection against 
Superfund liability. Traditionally, landowners looked to title com-
panies and insurance companies for shields against liability. Today 
277 Nunn v. Chemical Management, II\c., 22 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1763,1766-67 (D. Kan. 
1985). 
278 If the buyer wishes to incorporate either an indemnity clause or a warranty that the land 
is environmentally sound, it is imperative that the clause be written to survive closing. Without 
such a clause, the agreement is terminated at closing and the terms will not merge into the 
deed. 
278 The SEC has promUlgated regulations regarding the disclosure of information concerning 
hazardous waste materials. See generally, Varnum and Achterman, Toxic Waste Liability: A 
Risk in Acquisitions, Nat. L.J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 15 col. Therefore, the federal anti-fraud 
laws concerning the sale of securities may present a remedy where common law fraud is not 
available. 
280 See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924(6) (1984); 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.147,265.147 (1986) (redesignated 
40 C.F.R. §§ 264.148,265.148 by 51 Fed. Reg. 37,854 (1986). 
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these traditional shields are scarcely available.281 Courts have held 
that title companies have no duty to indemnify landowners for their 
failure to discover hazardous waste on the property because hazard-
ous waste contamination is not a common law lien on the land. 282 
Title insurance covers only clouds on the title. Although CERCLA 
liability will certainly effect the ability to sell the property, it is not 
a cloud on the title in the traditional sense. Consequently, courts 
will not construe a title insurance policy to cover hazardous condi-
tions on the property which may have given rise to environmental 
liability.283 As a result, although title insurance is available to the 
purchaser of land containing hazardous waste, such insurance is 
useless as a means to mitigate the impact of Superfund liability. 284 
In contrast, most general insurance contracts provide a shield 
against environmental liability. Until recently, insurers and the gen-
eral public shared a perception that legal responsibilities, including 
environmental liabilities, always would be insurable at a price. 285 
However, underwriters have displayed a growing tendency to refuse 
to insure against environmental torts because the field no longer 
conforms to the fundamental principles of tort law and, therefore, 
the insurance carrier's risk is not determinable.286 As Richard 
Schmaltz said before the United States Senate Committee on En-
vironment and Public Works on behalf of the American Insurance 
Association: 
If a loss is certain to happen, then there is no risk of loss to 
transfer, and an insurance transaction cannot take place. There 
is a growing perception among underwriters that the cumulation 
of legal remedies provided under state and federal law, together 
281 See Environmental Insurance Called 'Nightmare,' [17 Current Developments], Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 791 (Sept. 26, 1986); Hadzi-Antich, Coveragefor Environmental Liabilities Under 
the Comprehensive General Liability Policy: How to Walk a Bull Through a China Shop, 17 
CONN. L. REV. 769 (1985); Schmalz, SujJerfunds and Tort Law Reforms-Are They Insura-
ble?, 38 Bus. LAW. 175 (1982). 
282 E.g., United States v. Allied Chern. Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1205, 1206 (N.D. Cal. 1984) 
(encumbrance does not include hazardous waste). 
283 See generally Pedowitz, Title Insurance: Non-coverage of Hazardous Waste Superliens, 
13 PROBATE & PROP. 46 (1985). 
284 It should be noted, however, that a title insurer may be liable for any encumberances on 
the property which result from the Superlien provision of SARA, since such provisions affect 
title. See SARA, § 107(0. 
285 For a discussion of why insurance rates are so high and why insurance for hazardous 
waste liability may be unavailable see, Teff, Alarm/rom London, 15 THE BRIEF 16 (1985); 
see also Ericsson, Insurance Furor, 15 THE BRIEF 10, 13 (1985). 
286 Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237 
(1986). See also Sparrow, Hazardous Waste Insurance Coverage: Unexpected Past, Uncertain 
Future, 64 MICH. B.J. 169, 171-72 (1985). 
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with a spreading adoption of the CERCLA concepts of respon-
sibility, are increasing a hitherto insurable probability of loss to 
an uninsurable, virtual certainty. 287 
The availability of insurance in the field of environmental liability 
has reached a crisis stage. The consequence of the courts' expansive 
interpretation of liability provisions is that most insurance companies 
either have refused to cover land which poses an environmental risk 
or have priced the cost of coverage so high that insurance becomes 
economically impracticable. 288 The unpredictable and expansive na-
ture of CERCLA liability has resulted in the virtual unavailability 
of comprehensive liability insurance, the traditional shield of the 
landowner, for industries involved with the production of hazardous 
waste. 
2. Environmental Investigation 
The best advice an attorney can give the client who fears environ-
mental liability resulting from the sale of land is to examine carefully 
the land.289 The new "innocent landowner" provision of SARA290 
287 Schmalz, Developments In Concepts of Causation (July 10, 1985) (Paper Presented to 
the Torts and Insurance Practice Section Energy Resources Law Committee). 
288 See Schmalz, supra note 281. 
289 A purchaser is potentially liable for hazardous waste found on the site as a current owner, 
but if he buys a business he may be liable for any waste generated or transported by the 
prior owner if he continues the prior owner's operations. See supra notes 140-87 and accom-
panying text. Therefore, purchasers must check into past records of off-site waste disposal as 
well as on-site disposal when a business, rather than merely land, is purchased. 
290 The innocent landowner provision of SARA reads as follows: 
The term 'contractual relationship', for the purpose of section 107(b)(3), includes, 
but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instruments transferring title or 
possession, unless the real property on which the facility concerned is located was 
acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance 
on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the circumstances described in clause (i), 
(ii), or (iii) is also established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence: 
"(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not 
know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the 
subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the 
facility. 
"(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by 
escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through 
the exercise of eminent domain authority by purchase or condemnation. 
"(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest. 
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish that he has 
satisfied the requirements of section 107(b)(3)(A) and (B). 
"(B) To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in clause 
(i) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have undertaken, at 
the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses 
of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort 
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implicitly requires purchasers of property to examine it for hazard-
ous waste, in that the provision does not absolve from Superfund 
liability purchasers who do not make a reasonably diligent investi-
gation.291 A purchaser may check for environmental compliance in a 
number of ways. The following is a checklist that the concerned 
client should use to assess environmental risk: 
*Consider the type of land and facilities involved. Is the facility 
likely to generate hazardous waste? What is the hydrogeology of the 
land? Is the land conducive to storage of hazardous waste? How 
likely is it that contamination existing on the land will spread? How 
far? At what rate? Is it likely to effect residential or agricultural 
land? 
*Consider the age and ownership history of the land. For what 
purposes is the land currently used? What have been past uses? Is 
there a trash heap or a waste site? Does the site contain any drums 
or stagnant pools? Does the land have any unusual bumps that do 
not follow the general terrain? Are there or have there been any 
abandoned roads? In other words, might there be any buried or 
concealed drums on the site? 
*Consider the security of the site. How large is the developed 
portion of the land compared with the vacant portion? Is there public 
access to the undeveloped portions? Is there much traffic by the site? 
How often has the site been checked, by foot or by air, for changes 
in the terrain? Is the topography of the land such that an unauthor-
to minimize liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence the court shall take into 
account any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant, the 
relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, 
commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the 
obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and 
the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection. 
"(C) Nothing in this paragraph or in section 107(b)(3) shall diminish the liability of 
any previous owner or operator of such facility who would otherwise be liable under 
this Act. Notwithstanding this paragraph, if the defendant obtained actual knowledge 
of the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at such facility when 
the defendant owned the real property and then subsequently transferred ownership 
of the property to another person without disclosing such knowledge, such defendant 
shall be treated as liable under section 107(a)(l) and no defense under section 107(b)(3) 
shall be available to such defendant. 
"(D) Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the liability under this Act of a defendant 
who, by any act or omission, caused or contributed to the release or threatened 
release of a hazardous substance which is the subject of the action relating to the 
facility. 
SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101(0, 100 Stat. (1986) (codified at CERCLA § 101(35), 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(35». 
29) [d. 
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ized dumping would be readily discovered? Could this land be, or 
might it have been, the subject of a midnight dumping? 
*Consider the neighboring facilities. Are there any facilities 
nearby that may have generated, transported or stored hazardous 
waste? Does any nearby facility currently generate, transport or 
store hazardous waste? Are there any homes or farms nearby which 
may be the source of personal injury suits if the release should 
spread? 
*Consider the physical composition of the site. Is the~e chemical 
or material used on the site which may have spilled accidentally? 
Are there any chemicals used in the plant, or transported to or from 
the plant, which might leak into the environment? What type of 
wastes does the facility generate? Do the neighboring facilities use 
state of the art technology? Are neighboring facilities likely to con-
taminate ground water? 
*Consider machines used on the land. Do they contain substances 
which might leak as they get older, or are abandoned? For example, 
many old buildings contain transformers which contain PCBs, a 
hazardous substance under CERCLA. These transformers rust as 
they get older and often leak. Thus, old transformers are unwitting 
sources of environmental violations. 
*Consider substances used in the building. Many old buildings are 
insulated with asbestos, a hazardous material as defined by both 
CERCLA and RCRA. 
*Consider the types of permits and licenses the past owner held 
concerning the land and the facility. Do any permits or licenses 
indicate a source of environmental liability? Was the owner consci-
entious in maintaining the correct permits? Bad records may indicate 
a general lack of maintenance of the property. 
*Consider the insurance history of the site. Who insured the land? 
For what time period? What did the policy say? Is the policy avail-
able? Is the policy likely to cover liability under CERCLA (in light 
of the most recent insurance coverage cases)? If the policy covers 
CERCLA liability, retain copies of the policy and consider using it 
in bargaining for an indemnity agreement. 
*Consider the future plans for the site. Is the site the subject of 
any short term or long range county plans? What is the development 
trend of the area? Is it possible that future development might 
damage existing waste sites? Will future activities in the area in-
crease the likelihood of a release, add to existing waste sites, or 
increase the risk of a midnight dumping? Will future development 
make the cleanup of the site more difficult (and, hence, more expen-
sive)? 
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*Consider the likelihood of suit. Is the site listed on the National 
Contingency Plan?292 Is the property the subject of state or local 
concern? Are there any other potentially responsible parties who 
are solvent and might share in the liability for response costs? 
*Consider the contamination itself. How bad is it? What is the 
contamination's depth and width? How easily and at what expense 
can the problem be corrected? Would further use of the property 
require environmental permits (for instance under RCRA)? 
Although this checklist concerns primarily purchasers of real prop-
erty, the considerations raised are equally applicable to lenders as 
well as to transferees in mergers, consolidations, and acquisitions 
where the acquired corporation owns any real property. Transferees, 
however, should contemplate certain additional considerations if they 
acquire real estate by a transaction other than a simple purchase of 
property. For example, if a merger or consolidation (or any other 
transaction in which stock is exchanged) is contemplated, consider 
the other assets and operations of the company to be acquired. Does 
the company to be acquired engage or has it ever engaged in any 
activities which generate hazardous waste? If so, how and where 
were these wastes disposed? Who handled the disposal? Is that 
company still solvent? What method of disposal was used? Does the 
company to be acquired have reason to believe that the disposal 
company may not have complied with the disposal agreement or 
used a methodology other than what it claimed to have used? What 
did the disposal agreement say? 
The sources used to gather information can be as revealing to the 
buyer as the information itself. The smart seller will cooperate in 
giving the buyer all the information he needs. The seller who coop-
erates is less likely to be saddled with the entire liability, because 
the buyer will have acted as a prudent businessman and his decision 
to buy the property will be deemed a calculated business risk. The 
seller who discloses the requested information will be more likely to 
be shielded from liability on the basis of fraud. 
Although the smart seller cooperates in disclosing information, 
many sellers are not cooperative. Thus, the buyer must be able to 
obtain the needed information from other sources. 293 The following 
292 See supra note 40. 
Z93 Panel Discussion, "Basic Business and Real Estate Transactions: Dealing with Superfund 
and Hazardous Waste Liabilities", Presented by the ABA Environmental Controls, Committee 
Section on Corporation, Business and Banking Law, and the Environmental Law Committee, 
Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law (July 9, 1985) [hereinafter "Panel Discus-
sion"]; see also Lawler, Hazardous Waste and Real Property Transactions: How to Avoid It 
and What to Do If You Find It, 40 WASH. ST. B. NEWS, 11 (Oct. 1986). 
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is a list of potential sources a prospective buyer may use to obtain 
information about the site despite an uncooperative seller and to 
ascertain whether the information received is truthful and accurate: 
*Check state and federal environmental records to see if the site 
has ever been listed to have been in need of cleanup. The National 
Priority list maintained by the EPA is printed in the Federal Reg-
ister. The Maryland Register or equivalents in other states list local 
sites. The prospective buyer should make Freedom of Information 
Act requests to the EPA to determine if past owners made CERCLA 
section 103(c) notifications. The RCRA section 3010 notification list 
and the Remedial Response Information System listing of hazardous 
waste sites also may provide additional sources of information about 
a site. 
*Interview parties who might be familiar with the site. Former 
employers and employees who have worked with the company for a 
long time frequently have a better knowledge than management of 
how waste is actually handled. They often know the location of spills 
and what action, if any, was taken to clean or cover up these spills. 
Management often lacks knowledge of daily mishaps which might 
result in liability, but employees frequently are aware of such oc-
currences. Employees no longer employed with the company often 
are willing to talk about possible problems at the site. 
*N eighbors often know a great deal about the activities of the 
site's landowners-especially if they are concerned about the activ-
ities which occur in the area. Inquire about any organized, or un-
organized, grievances by neighboring landowners concerning activ-
ities on the site. Neighbors are also good sources of information 
about past activities on the land. 
*Discussions with management can be useful in obtaining infor-
mation regarding site history, environmental compliance, processes 
used on the premises, raw materials used, the types of wastes and 
by-products produced, how and where the company disposed of these 
wastes and by-products as well as how the company handled com-
plaints from neighbors. 
*Discussions with citizens or environmental groups may yield in-
formation about the site or its surrounding area. Contact with such 
groups should be handled with caution, however, as inquiry may 
lead to activity by the group. 
*Discussions with local real estate brokers and agents may be 
helpful in determining information concerning the site and its rela-
tive value over the past few years. Real estate agents are often 
familiar with who bought and sold land, how they did so, and for 
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what purpose. If the property values in the area have changed for 
reasons attributable to the site or its surrounding area, an experi-
enced real estate agent in the locality is likely to know about that 
change and why it occurred. 
*County records can be very useful in discovering past uses of the 
premises. Building permit records, tax assessment work sheets, and 
the planning and zoning boards are all fertile sources of information 
regarding the past, present and potential uses of the property and 
adjacent properties. 
*Environmental documents of interest would include: permits is-
sued; records of product spills and losses; reports to, by, or for a 
state, local, or federal environmental agency; enforcement actions 
by environmental agencies; records of waste analysis; foundation 
boring and well drilling records and tests; drawings and specifica-
tions for landfills; and environmental audits. 
*Have an environmental engineer check groundwater character-
istics and surrounding land uses to answer the following questions: 
Do any nearby waterways show any evidence of contamination? Does 
the topography indicate that the site in question might be the source 
of the contamination? If a spill occurred on a neighboring site, is the 
waste likely to migrate to the facility? 
*Check an atlas, maps and newspapers regarding past usage and 
owners of the land. If the site is a point of economic importance to 
the community, check the records in the local library for sources of 
historical information (many libraries have "vertical" files about im-
portant people, places, and industry in the area). 
*Finally, on-site investigation provides one of the best sources of 
information. Besides walking the site and looking for overt evidence 
of environmental damage (via use of the senses), certain scientific 
tests may be used to check for the presence of hazardous waste. 
These tests include: hydrogeological studies, material analysis, aerial 
photography, and metal detection (to look for buried drums or stor-
age tanks). 
3. Requirement of Disclosure and the Effect of Voluntary Cleanup 
The purchaser of land who discovers hazardous waste on his prop-
erty is faced with the problem of whether to report the site. Envi-
ronmental statutes make failure to report the leakage of a hazardous 
substance a criminal act. 294 Environmental officials report that they 
294 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1982). 
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receive an increasing number of voluntary reports coupled with a 
plan for cleanup.295 As noted earlier in this article, buyers who 
attempt to abate the nuisance generally are found less liable, pro-
portionately, than those who leave the site in its hazardous condi-
tion.296 CERCLA requires prompt reporting of the site297 and a 
report will not, by itself, evidence the buyer's lessened culpability. 298 
Buyers, however, who have proposed cleanup plans for the site, 
have been more likely to retain control over the cleanup of the site 
and have decreased the likelihood of having to submit to an EPA 
cleanup plan (which is likely to be more costly}. 299 The EPA, although 
not required to approve privately proposed plans, generally ap-
proves reasonable ones. 300 The courts have yet to resolve whether a 
defendant successfully could raise voluntary cleanup as a defense to 
or a mitigating factor in assessing section 107 liability. 301 
4. The Reduced Purchase Price 
Businessmen often set off environmental risk by reducing the 
purchase price of the site. The courts have viewed a reduced pur-
chase price for land containing hazardous waste materials as an 
acknowledgment by the buyer that he is aware that the land contains 
such wastes. 302 Despite the fact that liability under CERCLA does 
not demand that the owner-operator have knowledge of the wastes, 
courts have used reduced purchase price to show that the defendant 
was not an "innocent purchaser," but had assumed the risk of envi-
ronmental liability in exchange for a lower purchase price. 303 The 
courts have found no bar to assessing the buyer with liability for 
cleanup costs under CERCLA when the buyer was a sophisticated 
296 "Panel Discussion," supra note 293. 
296 See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text. 
297 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (1982). 
298 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)(3) (1982). 
299 Section 104 of CERCLA permits governmental action only when the cleanup would not 
otherwise have occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982). 
300 See National Contingency Plan 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(i)(1) (1986) (lead agency shall choose 
cost effective remedial alternative which effectively abates threat and provides public with 
adequate protection). 
301 E.g., United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (company 
that cleaned up its waste at site nevertheless sued for costs); United States v. Carolawn Co., 
14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20696,20696-700 (June 15, 1984) (D. S.C. 1984) (company 
that removed a substantial portion of its waste included in surface cleanup action). 
302 E.g., United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D. N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F. 2d 204 (3d 
Cir. 1982). 
303 Id. 
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businessman and not an "innocent purchaser. "304 Thus, the effect of 
a purchase price which is obviously below market value is to impute 
the purchaser with at least constructive, if not actual, knowledge of 
the potential for environmental liability. 305 
Likewise, innocent purchasers may be held liable under Superfund 
as current owners if they did not diligently investigate the site prior 
to purchase. As liable persons, these innocent parties may be held 
strictly liable for the entire cost of cleanup. If, however, the sellers 
are still solvent, innocent purchasers stand a good chance of dem-
onstrating to the court that their apportioned share of liability is 
quite minimal compared to that of the seller. Therefore, the effect 
of a reduced purchase price is to indicate that the buyer knows of 
the risk of liability but will accept that risk of suit. A reduced 
purchase price may indicate a willingness on the buyer's part to 
indemnify the seller against Superfund liability. A buyer is thus well-
advised to include an indemnification agreement in the contract if 
purchasers obtain the property at a reduced purchase price. 
5. Use of Opinion Letter and Certification of Environmental 
Compliance 
Due to the increased potential for incurring financial liability under 
stricter environmental laws, many lenders are demanding legal opin-
ions concerning the compliance of the borrowers with relevant en-
vironmental laws and regulations. While these opinions most often 
are used in the context of loan transactions, prospective purchasers 
of both land and businesses also may find opinion letters equally 
useful. 
The difficulty in using opinion letters is that the field of environ-
mental law is rapidly changing and quite extensive. A buyer would 
have an extremely difficult time certifying, without reservations, 
that any given site, business, partnership or corporation was in 
compliance with all relevant environmental and land use laws, or-
ders, rules and regulations. Instead, the parties will need to nego-
tiate about the environmental issues the attorney is to evaluate, and 
about the experts (such as architects, engineers, geologists and per-
haps a toxicologist) who will determine the compliance strategies 
necessary with regard to those matters. An attorney can then pro-
304 Id.; see also Baldwin, Hazardous Waste Problems-Implications for Developers, The 
Daily Record 3 (Nov. 21, 1985). 
305 E.g., New York v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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vide assurances concerning compliances which may form the basis 
of apportioning future liability, if any. 306 
B. Protecting the Seller/Client 
1. Disclosure Prior to Sale 
The common law concept of caveat emptor is quite Dld. 307 The 
concept of caveat venditor has developed much more recently.308 Both 
Congress and the courts have, however, acknowledged that under 
certain circumstances sellers may be liable to their buyers for non-
disclosure of material information. 
Fraud is among the common law causes of action which were used 
prior to the enactment of CERCLA to hold persons liable for the 
sale of land containing hazardous waste when the seller did not 
disclose such facts.309 Thus, common law fraud was, and continues 
to be, a cause of action available to the innocent purchaser of a waste 
site against his predecessor. 
Under CERCLA, the buyer's liability was based on his status as 
a current owner or operator. 310 As discussed earlier, under the sta-
tutory design, the seller's liability was dependent solely upon his 
relationship with the land when he owned it. To be held liable under 
CERCLA for the costs of the cleanup, the seller must have stored, 
generated or transported the waste, or owned the land at the time 
of the release. 311 Theoretically, a seller who was not a generator, 
transporter or owner at the time of release could not have been held 
liable under CERCLA. "Intervening owners" were not covered per-
sons under CERCLA.312 SARA ended this loophole, which absolved 
306 Although opinion letters have hitherto been used only infrequently in the environmental 
field, their use is a common practice among bond lawyers. 
307 Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules Inc., 22 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1865, 1871 (3d Cir. 
1985). For a thorough discussion of the history of the common law concept of caveat emptor 
see Comment, Caveat Venditor in Maryland Condominium Sales: Cases and Legislation 
Imposing Implied Warranties in Sales of Residential Condominiums, 14 U. BALT. L. REV. 
116, 117-21 (1984). 
308 The concept of caveat venditor has developed with particular vigor in the securities 
context. See generally T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 438-506 (1985). 
309 See United States v. Bissel, No. 483-8745 (D. Md. Filed 1984) (case settled). 
Negligence, trespass, nuisance, and strict liability were among the other common law actions 
available prior to the enactment of CERCLA. See Note, In Search of Liability for Hazardous 
Waste Dumping, 29 S.D.L. REV. 473, 482-89 (1984). 
810 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). 
811 Id. 
812Id. But see United States v. Carolawn Co., 21 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124 (D.S.C. 
1984) (company which held title for one hour may be liable under CERCLA). 
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from liability intervening owners, who deceitfully transferred land 
to unwitting buyers. SARA added section 101(35)(C) which imposes 
liability upon sellers who knew of the existence of a site and failed 
to disclose it to the purchaser. 313 This legislative change represents 
a dramatic departure from the practice under the original Superfund 
legislation. By inserting this provision, the legislature codified the 
policy considerations underlying the common law tort of fraud. 
Thus, the law will protect neither purchasers of land who were 
not prudent in making their purchase, nor sellers who unfairly fo-
isted their hazard on another.314 Because both the common law action 
of fraud and the new section 101(35) are available to the innocent 
purchaser of a site, it is in the best interest of the seller to disclose 
to the buyer all that is asked of him regarding possible environmental 
liability. Buyers who purchase without inquiring whether there is 
the possibility of hazardous waste or who have not investigated the 
site are not likely to prevail on either the count of fraud or under 
SARA.315 Such buyers are not the persons whom either the common 
law action of fraud or the SARA innocent landowner provision is 
designed to protect, since they have not met their duty of reasonable 
inquiry.316 Once the inquiry has begun, however, the seller would be 
wise to disclose all facts which a reasonable buyer would find ma-
terial. 317 As one court noted, the concept of caveat emptor is not only 
alive and well today, it flourishes. 318 But the law will not allow an 
innocent party to rectify his bad purchase through fraud. 
2. Provisions in the Contract of Sale-Indemnification and the "As 
Is" Sale 
What is the legal effect of disclosure? Courts have determined 
that sophisticated businessmen who have purchased land containing 
a hazardous waste site at a reduced price are not innocent purchas-
313 SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101(0, 160 Stat. (1986) (codified at CERCLA § 101(35)(C), 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(c)). 
314 State Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150 (1983). 
315 See SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101(0, 100 Stat. (1986) (to be codified at CERCLA 
§ 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)). 
316 See id. 
317 See Standard Equip. Inc. v. Boeing Co., 23 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2112 (C.D. Wash. 
1985) (RICO cause of action allowed where plaintiff alleged defendant engaged in fraudulent 
scheme to dump and where plaintiff alleged defendant concealed illegal activity). 
318 Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules Inc., 22 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1865, 1871 (3d Cir~ 
1985). 
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ers. 319 Rather, they are current owners under the Act. Thus, both 
the statute and case law suggests that courts will honor indemnity 
agreements or agreements to sell the land "as is" (even in the ab-
sence of environmental audit or review) made in the contract of sale 
where it is apparent that the land was sold at a reduced purchase 
price.320 Persons who opt to forgo their right to inspect the premises 
or admit to accept the risk of uncertain liability are not all innocent 
purchasers. By their actions (or inaction as the case may be) such 
persons bring themselves within the ambit of section 107(a). They 
are not the type of persons whom the statute is designed to pro-
tect,321 but rather their reckless conduct is the type which the Act 
expressly discourages. 322 
Although parties to a real estate transaction may make agree-
ments concerning indemnification or purchase of the property "as is" 
which are enforceable in court, these private agreements may not 
be raised as a defense against CERCLA liability. The courts will, 
however, consider the existence of such agreements when deciding 
whether or not to grant a motion to join the contract maker as a 
potentially responsible party and whether to apportion liability. 
In considering the use of an "as is" provision in a contract of sale, 
both buyer and seller must be cautious. A buyer who purchases 
subject to such a provision is likely to have assumed the risk of the 
entire cost of cleanup. In short, the practical effect of the "as is" 
provision would seem to create an indemnity provision for the seller 
against the buyer323 (but not against the government). SARA de-
mands that purchasers exercise reasonable diligence in investigating 
site~ purchased.321 Thus, a buyer who fails to exercise reasonable 
diligence and who accepts an "as is" agreement would seem to have 
no recourse against his seller. That is not, however, necessarily the 
case. SARA also imposes a corresponding burden upon sellers to 
disclose to the buyer the existence of the hazardous site if it is known 
or should be known to them. 325 Where the seller fails to make a 
819 United Stntes v. Price, 528 F. Supp. 1055, 1073 (D. N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d 
Cir. 1982). 
81!0 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1982); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049 
(D. Ariz. 1984), aJJ'd, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986). 
821 See SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101(f), 100 Stat. (1986) (codified at CERCLA 
§ 101(35)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(85)(A)(i». 
822 [d. 
828 See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984), aJl'd on 
other grounds, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986). 
824 SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101(f), 100 Stat. 1616 (1986) (codified at CERCLA 
§ 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B». 
825 [d. at 1617 (codified at CERCLA § 101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C». 
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disclosure, the buyer has a cause of action under SARA, as well as 
the common law tort of fraud, against the seller. 
So how does the "as is" agreement fit into these reciprocal duties? 
Courts are likely to look at the relative experience, sophistication 
and power of the bargaining parties. Where both parties are sophis-
ticated investors in real estate, the buyer's duty to investigate should 
prevail over the seller's duty to disclose. Use of an "as is" clause 
should raise a question in the mind of a sophisticated purchaser and 
cause him to undertake an extremely diligent inspection. Where the 
buyer is a relatively unsophisticated party and the seller is rather 
sophisticated (a large corporation or in the business of selling real 
estate for example), then the seller's duty to disclose should be 
paramount over the buyer's duty to investigate. The bottom line in 
any analysis, however, are the facts and circumstances of the par-
ticular case. Thus, the parties should be wary of the "as is" agree-
ment. It may foist tremendous liability upon a buyer or it may 
constitute an admission by the seller that he did not make adequate 
disclosure as required by SARA. Accordingly, whenever an "as is" 
clause is contemplated, sellers should be careful to document their 
disclosure to the buyers. Similarly, buyers should take care to detail 
their inspection of the premises. Only with a detailed documentation 
can the parties maintain their respective (possibly) protected status 
under SARA. 
C. Protecting the Lender/Client 
Lenders are in a peculiar position in the acquisition process. While 
not an owner per se, in some states mortgagees have a title interest 
in the mortgaged property.326 In enacting CERCLA, Congress con-
sidered the predicament of mortgagees in these title theory states, 
and carved out an exception in subsection 101(20)(A) in which equity 
owners holding merely a security interest in the property were 
excluded from the definition of covered persons.327 Despite the lan-
guage in subsection 101(20)(A), however, banks have been held liable 
as the current owner and operator of a hazardous waste site.328 The 
following criteria should be considered by lenders both before con-
326 See Stokes, Super Liens, Superfund and Other Environmental Aspects of Real Estate 
Transactions 33 (Aug. 11, 1986) (paper presented to ABA). 
327 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982). For sample opinion letters and engineers' certificates, 
see Stokes, supra note 326, at 34-37. 
328 See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md. 1986); 
see also supra notes 203-13 and accompanying text. 
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summating the loan and again if default should occur and foreclosure 
is contemplated: 
*Does the borrower currently own and operate, or has he in the 
past owned or operated, a hazardous waste disposal (or any other 
type) site? 
*Could the creation of toxic wastes occur as a by-product of the 
borrower's past, current or future activities? 
* Are there any underground storage tanks on the site which may 
contain hazardous waste? 
*If a site exists or might reasonably be created, how extensive is 
the quantity of waste? What is its toxicity? How likely is the site to 
shift or expand? 
*Would clean up of the site, if necessary, enhance the value of the 
collateral enough to justify the clean-up costs as a business expense? 
Is it likely that a complete cleanup is possible? 
*Is the site the result of illegal operations (e.g., improper storage, 
illegal dumping, or operation of the site without proper permitting) 
or is the site the end product of operations at a lawful site? In other 
words, might the existence of the site be the subject of criminal as 
well as civil sanctions? 
*Would cleanup, if necessary, be best handled by private contract 
or by governmental action, considering all legal, social, political and 
economic ramifications? 
After evaluating the site and extending the loan, there are certain 
precautions a lender may wish to take to strengthen his position. 
First, because of the expansive definition of owner or operator under 
CERCLA, it is advisable for a lender to never make a loan to the 
operator of a hazardous waste site. If the lender chooses to make 
such a loan (and to prevent liability in the event that such a trans-
action is unwittingly undertaken), the lender should make contrac-
tual arrangements so that the lender is sure that the borrower, or 
his guarantors, will bear the cost of cleanup rather than the lender 
himself. 329 
329 For example, the lender can require: covenants in the loan requiring compliance with 
applicable environmental laws and requiring the borrower to affirm such compliance on. a 
periodic basis; a financially solid guarantor of the loan; a bond to be posted in case of environ-
mental liability; environmental liability insurance; a collateral description which excludes toxic 
wastes as a part of the collateral. 
For further discussion of lender liability see, Cohen, Hazardous Waste: A Threat to the 
Lender's Environment, 19 D.C.C. L.J. 99 (1986); Burcat, Environmental Liability of Credi-
tors: Open Season on Banks, Creditors, and Other Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING L.J. 509 
(1986). 
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Secondly, if the borrower defaults, the lender should never get 
involved in the management of the site and limit workout advice to 
strictly financial matters. The courts interpreting the definition of 
owner and operator under section 107 of CERCLA have all looked 
to control participation in the management of the site as relevant 
factors in determining liability.330 It is, therefore, axiomatic that if 
a lender does not become involved in the management and avoids 
control over the company, he is much less likely to be held liable for 
response costs unde: ... the Act. 
Finally, if the lender does find himself in a situation in which the 
borrower has defaulted and there are no guarantors (or financially 
solvent guarantors) to the loan, the lender may have to make a 
financial decision as to whether foreclosure on the site is a viable 
remedy or if it would be more financially rewarding to walk away 
and abandon the property. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
No statutory remedy is without problems, and nearly all statutes 
require judicial clarification. Congress enacted Superfund in order 
to facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste. The legislation 
was passed in the eleventh hour of a lame duck Congress which was 
reacting to public outcry over hazardous waste sites. The Act, de-
spite recent revision, is riddled with ambiguities and unclarities. 
In interpreting Superfund, the courts have taken the concept of 
strict liability to an unprecedented extreme, such that the Act has 
become a "deep pocket" statute. Superfund liability may not be 
avoided by "responsible persons," as defined by the Act, despite the 
parties' lack of culpability. CERCLA liability may, therefore, arise 
and reek havoc in real estate and commercial transactions involving 
relatively innocent persons-persons who had no direct relation to, 
or control over, the creation of the hazard. CERCLA has thus de-
veloped into a modern snake in the grass. Liability, and potential 
liability, under the Act is often concealed. Superfund liability may 
arise in any real estate or commercial transaction involving land, 
often without warning. 
Moreover, because costs incurred in cleaning up abandoned waste 
sites are so high,331 CERCLA has become a witch hunt statute. 
330 See supra notes 188-216 and accompanying text. 
331 See supra note 269. Not only are the costs presently high, the new Act is going to make 
them even higher for it allows the government to charge interest on response costs accrued. 
In addition, the new preferences for total cleanup will increase costs even further than they 
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Superfund allows the government to seek out parties who are only 
marginally responsible for the dump and hold them wholly liable 
because they are financially able to bear the cost of cleanup.332 The 
government is forced to search out deep pockets because the Fund 
would be quickly depleted if it were not reimbursed by private 
parties. 333 The theory underlying the statute is let the persons who 
profited from the creation and disposal of the wastes pay for the 
cleanup rather than the taxpayers.334 Unfortunately, this concept is 
naive. First, the costs saved by forcing private parties to clean up 
sites are greatly reduced when one considers the enormous expense 
incurred in litigating liability. Second, the private parties pass on 
the costs of cleanups to their consumers. Thus, the general public 
winds up paying for the costs of cleanup and the costs of litigating 
the issue who will clean the site up. 
In short, although CERCLA has accomplished its goal of cleaning 
up some hazardous waste sites, it is fraught with problems in need 
of resolution. The Superfund program requires the expenditure of 
vast amounts of money in litigating liability. These sums are better 
spent on the actual site cleanup. 
Although a good idea in theory, Superfund has created as many 
problems as it resolved. 335 It, therefore, would be advisable for the 
American people to re-evaluate the current program. The witch hunt 
mentality of the Superfund liability provisions benefit the American 
people only in the short term. In the long term it will cost the public 
more money than it is designed to save. 
had been under the old Act even discounting the interest charged. See Incineration Could 
Increase Cleanup Costs Under Superfund By Tenfold, Moreland Says [17 Current Develop-
ments], Env't Rep. (BNA) 709 (Sept. 12, 1986). 
332 EPA Chief Asks Senate Judiciary to Retain Joint, Several Liability in Superfund Law, 
[16 Current Developments] Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 270 (June 14, 1985). 
333 More than 750,000 businesses generate some quantity of hazardous waste. In both 1978 
and 1979, the EPA estimated that 90% of hazardous waste produced in this country was 
disposed of improperly. See Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Joint Hearings on S.lS41 
and S.1480 Before the Subcomms. on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of 
the Senate Comm. on Environmental and Public Works (Part 4), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 
(1979) (statement of Thomas C. Jorling). 
334 For a thorough discussion of this theory, see Note, Liability for Generators of Hazardous 
Waste: The Failure of Existing Enforcement Mechanisms, 69 GEO. L.J. 1047 (1981). 
335 E.g., Freeman, Tort Law Reform: SuperfundlRCRA Liability as a Major Cause of the 
Insurance Crisis, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 517 (1986). 
